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Abstract
Rationality points to the complete annihilation and end of a life when the body perishes, and yet
when a loved one dies we continue to experience that person in a myriad of ways. The focus of
this thesis will be a phenomenological exploration of the earthly afterlife of those we have loved
and lost. By positing the subject as always inter-subjective and as temporal in nature, this thesis
will investigate how we continue to create and interact with the deceased upon the earth. In the
introduction, this work will be placed in the context of the phenomenological tradition; the first
chapter will set out a subject consisting of present body, future earth/ world, and past memories;
the second chapter will posit the foundation of such a subjectivity upon inter-subjectivity or the
in-between the I and the other, in which the present body emerges from the caress, the future
world is produced by natality, and past memories are cultivated by language; in the third chapter,
cartoons, photography, and fine art are used to explore how an inter-subjectivity so conceived
can help us to understand our connection to the deceased and continue to create and live with the
dead. This work aims to conceptualize, celebrate, and live our relationships in a temporally
liminal and environmentally vitalist way.

Keywords: Bergson, Levinas, Arendt, Irigaray, Heidegger, Subjectivity, Intersubjectivity,
philosophy, memory, earth, body, flesh, caress, world, natality, language, death, art
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Let us go then, you and I,
When the evening is spread out against the sky
Like a patient etherized upon a table;
Let us go, through certain half-deserted streets,
The muttering retreats
Of restless nights in one-night cheap hotels
And sawdust restaurants with oyster shells:
Streets that follow like a tedious argument
Of insidious intent
To lead you to an overwhelming question…
Oh do not ask “What is it?”
Let us go and make our visit.

-

The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, T.S. Eliot
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The Tapestry of Memory:
Introduction1

“But I’ll see you in the clouds above, in the tall grass, in the ones I love, you’re going to
make me lonesome when you go.”2 Presumably lamenting a breakup with a restless but
passionate lover, Bob Dylan’s popular ballad directs our attention to the fact that those who we
love deeply become infused into our lives in a myriad of ways. When someone is physically

1

Artwork: Vincent Van Gogh, Starry Night over the Rhone, oil on canvas (Paris: Musee
D’Orsay, 1888).
2
Bob Dylan, “You’re going to make me Lonesome,” in Blood on the Tracks
(Minneapolis: Columbia, 1975).
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absent, we see that person everywhere. She or he colours the fabric of our world with his or her
unique personality traits, ideas, and even physical attributes. This phenomenon holds true not just
for romantic breakups, but extends towards the ultimate end of a relationship; the death of the
other. Mary Elizabeth Frye’s 1932 poem makes this vitalist link between the world of the
bereaved and the continuation of the deceased person’s life:

Do not stand at my grave and weep.
I am not there; I do not sleep.
I am a thousand winds that blow.
I am the diamond glints on snow.
I am the sunlight on ripened grain.
I am the gentle autumn rain.
When you awaken in the morning’s hush
I am the swift uplifting rush
Of quiet birds in circled flight.
I am the soft star that shines at night.
Do not stand at my grave and cry;
I am not there; I did not die.3
In this poem, we are struck by a blatant refusal to acknowledge death as a complete severance
from a particular way of being. The traditional philosophical and scientific notions of death as a
definitive end are refuted in favor of a vitalism wherein the deceased continues on in the world
after death. It is not clear in Frye’s poem if this continuation happens as an idealist vitalism
through the mourner alone (because I loved the deceased, I see them in the beauty and sorrow of
the entire world) or if the dead person is objectively present in the surrounding earth via a
material vitalism (because the energy and matter that animated that particular person is recycled
into the earth upon her or his death, this energy continues on in the physical earth). Whether Frye
is referring to a subjective continuation in the bereaved or an objective continuation of the
deceased, the poem clearly states that death is not the end of life.
3

1996).

Mary Elizabeth Frye, Do Not Stand at My Grave and Weep (London: Souvenir Press,
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In his short story “The Premature Burial,” Edgar Allan Poe claims that “[t]he boundaries
which divide Life from Death are at best shadowy and vague. Who shall say where the one ends,
and where the other begins?”4 As Dylan and Frye have alluded, the lines of absence and presence
do not mark a distinct end. Poe draws the conclusion from this that death itself is not entirely
distinct and certain. It doesn’t happen suddenly or sharply, but in circling indecipherable
gradations. King Lear holds his dead daughter in his arms and exclaims, “I know when one is
dead and one lives.”5 And yet he cannot grasp where his dear Cordelia is in this stark divide. He
stretches out and muddies the liminal space between life and death as he holds her in his arms.
Against the finality of death, Poe’s fogginess between living and dead leads us to the two poles
of Lear’s reaction to Cordelia’s death: his logical confidence that he knows the difference
between the living and the dead and his inability to reify this certainty. In Lear we find the
analytic and phenomenal readings of death placed together. There is a biological and analytic
confidence to death; a gaping hole; a void where a unique and irreplaceable human life once
flourished. But so too is there an inexplicable continuation of the other who has died.
Everything rational points to the complete annihilation and end of a life when the body
perishes, but we can trace back religions such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism,
Buddhism, many sects of Native American religious practices and shamanic religions to the
same essential punchline; human death is not the end. Of course what death looks like is not the
same in any of these religions, but it is clear that they are all founded on poignant sensual
experience of the other after death. Like Dylan and Frye, these religions assume a moment of
realization that someone loved and lost is not absolutely absent.
Edgar Allan Poe, “The Premature Burial” in The Raven: Tales and Poems, ed. S.T.
Joshi, 200-215 (New York: Penguin Books, 2013).
5
William Shakespeare, King Lear, eds. Barbara Mowat and Paul Werstine (Toronto:
PocketBooks, 1993), 5, 3: 312.
4

Lawson 4

In the cold light of day, death is final; but at night, we linger with the dead in our
dreams;
At night I dream
She is still at my side. She
Carries her kit of colored
Threads. I see her image bent
Over her bag of silks. She
Mends and alters my clothes and
Worries for fear I might look
Worn and ragged.6
Waking, we see the dead out of the corner of our eyes but never straight on. We feel her presence
when we least expect it. Like Dylan, Leonard Cohen is focused on a broken heart when he
whispers, “I see your hand, I see your hair, your bracelets and your brush. I call to you, I call to
you, but I don’t call soft enough.”7 Those who are gone are still everywhere, but the form they
take on is radically altered and we cannot reach them as we once did. Our soft calls reverberate
into screams against vast empty corridors. The former ways of being with someone must be set
aside and a new way must be created.
The focus of this thesis will be a phenomenological exploration of the earthly afterlife of
those we have loved and lost. There are many phenomenologists who discuss death, most
notably, Martin Heidegger. In Being and Time, Heidegger gestures to, but does not engage fully
with, the death of another being. Because this short section (subsection 47 of part one), is as
truthful and poignant as it is upsetting and distasteful, and because it is foundational in later
phenomenological discourse on death, my introduction will be an exploration of this section of
Being and Time. The subsection on the death of the other is a momentary digression into a
phenomenon that cannot give Heidegger the answers he seeks. Heidegger allows us to glimpse
Mei Yao Ch’en, “A Dream at Night,” in One Hundred Poems From the Chinese, trans.
Kenneth Rexroth (New York: A New Directions Book, 48).
7
Leonard Cohen, “There ain’t no cure for love,” in I’m Your Man (Montreal and Los
Angeles: Columbia, 1988).
6
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the phenomenal possibility of being with the deceased after they have died and almost
simultaneously, he draws an unsurmountable ontological division between the living and the
deceased. Perhaps his work here is so compelling because it is imbued with both the cruel loss
and the hopeful continuation of the other in the world which that person inhabited. Heidegger
gives us neither the satisfaction of a complete annihilation of the other nor an ontological
lingering of the other before he whisks his project off in a different direction. Like much of
Heidegger’s work and like death itself, we are shown possible paths but are given no real
answers. For Heidegger, the philosophy is in the journey, not the destination. Furthermore, he
chooses not to take any of these paths further but to set aside the death of the other. My thesis
follows Heidegger’s road not taken towards earthly afterlife and our relationship to the deceased
other.
In subsection 47, Heidegger contemplates the possibility of the death of the other as a
means to access the totality of our own being through the death of our own Dasein. (Heidegger’s
term Dasein refers to a self-reflective and thinking being, namely the human). Dasein’s totality
or completeness is achieved only in its death: As the being that exists between birth and death,
Dasein is always reaching beyond itself towards its death. Heidegger notes that a possible way to
investigate the totality of my Dasein, as it would be achieved upon my death, could be deduced
by exploring the death of another Dasein. But he concludes that the other’s death is not adequate
in the investigation of my own death because the ontological difference (in which no two
Daseins are alike) is predicated on the distinction of death; “[t]he dying of others is not
something which we experience in a genuine sense; at most we are always just ‘there
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alongside…’”8 Heidegger continues, “we are asking about the ontological meaning of the dying
of the person who dies, as a possibility-of-being which belongs to his being. We are not asking
about the way in which the deceased has Dasein-with or is still-a-Dasein with those who are left
behind.”9 Each person’s death belongs solely to that person and this leads Heidegger to rule out
an exploration of our own death through the death of another. Because our own death marks the
end of our experience of the world as we know it (aka, through our sensual body and the
limitations and advantages of our human mind), the other’s death cannot offer us such an end for
Heidegger. We continue to live and sense as before and thus we experience this death
“alongside” as a mere spectator whose entire way of being remains relatively unchanged.
Heidegger is interested in the completion of the wholeness of Dasein, the likes of which cannot
be unearthed through our understanding of another’s death because each death is specific and
belongs only to the Dasein who dies.
While Heidegger’s project is interested in a phenomenology that begins with our birth,
ends with our death, and forever looks towards the undiscovered country that rounds our little
lives, my interest remains with that which Heidegger dismisses: the dead’s “Dasein-with … those
who are left behind.”10 This is the first of two ways in which my investigation veers from that of
Heidegger: the route and overall goal of our projects is different. His asks the question of
Dasein’s Being between its birth and its death. Mine asks the question of the human’s being after
death but still phenomenologically present on the earth. The second: the death of the other is not
that of a “stranger”11 as Heidegger suggests, but in certain cases, of someone who co-constitutes

8

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Staumbaugh (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 2010).
9
Ibid., 238.
10
Ibid., 239.
11
Ibid.
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our very being. This person still retains the radical individuality that Heidegger’s ontological
difference offers to each Dasein, but rather than making that a reason to avoid confusing our own
death with the death of others, we can see such a death as a vast and irreconcilable loss for our
own Dasein. The death of the particular radical other is the death of our way of being in the
world and can be a radical shift in the way we question being. Thus, the other’s death is a shift
in the very ground of our own Dasein. This stark difference from Being and Time makes
apparent that my project is not that of Heidegger, but rather takes his work seriously as a possible
path towards the earthly afterlife of human beings. With this established, I will now turn to two
contemporary commentaries on death in order to establish my second and more serious
divergence from Heidegger regarding the significance of the other’s death upon my own being.
In his phenomenological exploration of death, Robert Pogue Harrison aims to reconceive
Heidegger’s notion of death in Being and Time as something which “pertains to others before it
pertains to me. We hand our deaths over to one another, not because we are inauthentic but
because we are mortal… because our bonds and obligations draw their life from primordial
guilt...”12 On earth, upon our deaths, our afterlife is handed over to the community. We have
certain responsibilities to the dead. Reflecting upon the death of his brother, Thoreau articulates
this phenomenon: “On the death of a friend, we should consider that the fates through confidence
have devolved on us the task of a double living, that we have henceforth to fulfill the promise of
our friend's life also, in our own, to the world.”13 With the other’s death, our own life changes.
The link between the I and the other after death necessitates that the irrational and the real coexist. In Branka Arsic’s treatment of Thoreau, she claims that he believed in the liminal link

12

Ibid., 157.
Henry David Thoreau, Journal February 28, 1840. Quoted in Branka Arsic, Bird Relics
(London: Harvard University Press, 2016), x.
13
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between literature and life: “far from being something surreal, which could at best function as a
metaphor of something real, the fictional or even the irrational is part and parcel of the real.”14
This speaks to the importance of narrative in its capacity not just to teach us morals and societal
norms, but to intermingle with and create worlds. Arsic continues by posing the question, “What
have we done to alter the real into what is coherent, explicable, and knowable, expelling the
wondrous into an elsewhere that is only imagined?”15 This liminal nature of the real and the
irrational is necessary for our understanding of the subject after death, as it allows for a greater
movement between these boundaries of death and life. The process of the other’s death shows
itself as a process of transubstantiation, in which our spiritual inclinations merge with the
surrounding environment and the other shows herself in the natural world.
We take on the dreams and goals of the deceased in ways we could never have imagined
while they were alive. Their projects become our own. Their passions become our own. This is
not mere sentimentality or nostalgia, but a radical shifting of our own being in order to adapt to
and encompass the loss of a person who constituted our own personhood. Harrison’s articulation
of community and responsibility in the death of the other and Arsic’s link between the irrational
and the real, point us in the right direction as we return to Heidegger.
Let us turn back to my second divergence from Heidegger, which hinges on an important
paradox in subsection 47 where Heidegger claims that in mourning the dead, “the deceased
himself is no longer factically ‘there’”:16 While Heidegger posits that the deceased “has
abandoned our ‘world’ and left it behind,” he also claims that “in terms of that world those who

14

Branka Arsic, Bird Relics (London: Harvard University Press, 2016), 3.

15

Ibid., 4.
Heidegger, Being and Time, 230.

16
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remain can still be with him.”17 In death, Dasein is dismantled in that the da (there) is removed.
The deceased is no longer there. Yet somehow those who mourn can be here in this world with
the deceased. This textual paradox implies that in death, Dasein loses its da (there) but retains
something of its sein (being). In an average everyday sense, the human being is no longer
present, but there is still something remaining that others can be with.
Now we can arrive back at Heidegger’s ontological difference. Heidegger suggests that a
substitution of the other’s death for my own “demonstrably fails altogether to recognize Dasein’s
kind of being.”18 He argues that this is because it falls prey to forgetting the ontological
difference, which is what distinguishes Dasein: as Dasein, I am irreplaceable and unique while in
all other aspects of my life I am always replaceable. As a woman, a student, or a friend, I can
always be replaced by another woman, student, or friend. These labels belong to the ontic
(average everyday) world and make each person a series of generic classifications and nothing
more. But the unique part of me that can never be replaced is my Dasein. The ontological
difference is the recognition of the unspeakable quality that makes me radically unique from all
others. Heidegger argues that by attempting to understand our own death by the death of the
other, we forget the radically unique nature of Dasein. He claims that my own death cannot be
substituted or ontologically understood through the death “of a stranger [Fremden].”19 But this is
where Heidegger falls into his own trap: how did the other become a stranger? Moments ago we
mourned the other’s death and even experienced being with the other after her or his death. And
now that other has become Fremden or a mere stranger? It seems that while Heidegger is keen to
uphold the radical uniqueness of his own Dasein through his own death, the death of the other is

17

Ibid., 238.
Ibid., 238.
19
Ibid., 239.
18
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interchangeable with the death of any other. The death of someone loved and mourned is
equivalent to the death of a perfect stranger. In his mission to uphold his own ontological
difference, he denies it to others, or at least leaves them to worry about it themselves. The death
of an other is the death of an other is the death of an other. All I have to define my Dasein in its
totality is the death of myself.
Heidegger’s decision to deny radical uniqueness to others makes sense if Dasein is
considered as that being who questions its own being and whose own being is somehow bound
by a Kantian subjectivity. For all of Heidegger’s protestation that Dasein is not a subject, the way
it interacts with others links it rather definitively with the intersubjectivity of Kant’s subject as
set out in the third paralogism of the Critique of Pure Reason wherein the unity of apperception
(or the “I”) exists as a subject for itself but can never be more than an object to the other. The
double- I of Kant is I-as-soul in its interior temporality and I-as-body from the other’s exterior
spatiality. This means simply that I can only see myself from the inside (as a subject), but the
other sees me from the outside and through their gaze I recognize that I am also an object. Kant
deems this gaze of the subject upon itself as occurring in time and the gaze of the other upon my
subject as occurring in space. The I has no access to itself as a body without the objectifying
assertion of the other and conversely, the I never has access to the other as a subject. In
discussing the death of the other, it is evident that the Heideggerian subject remains in this
Kantian solipsistic subjectivity. The objectification of the other can be traced back further to
Cartesian proto-subjectivity in the Meditations. Looking out his window, Descartes cannot tell
for certain if other men are mere automatons. If I cannot be certain that others are not robots, I
certainly have little hope of any real intersubjectivity.
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This fleeting foray into the history of the modern subject is simply meant to find the roots
of my own divergence from Heidegger, which is grounded in the Heideggerian autonomy and
alienation of Dasein. When we build the foundation of the human in impenetrable isolation, it is
not a surprise that we end up in a society of individuals who feel profoundly alone even (or
especially) in the company of others. Heidegger has done much to overcome these solipsistic
hurtles: Dasein does not begin alone in contemplation, but in a world, with others, and specific
tasks and projects that make sense of the world and its people. Heidegger necessitates the
philosopher leave the fireside and exist in the world amongst others. But ultimately, by denying a
meaningful difference in the deaths of others, Heidegger shows us that he did not go far enough
for our purposes in this thesis. This Heideggerian rendition of an insurmountable subject/ object
distinction between self and other is an undeniable truth of the modern world. But it is a
constructed truth and completely counter to the phenomenon that this paper will be reaching for:
intersubjective memories and earthly afterlife. It now appears that while we see traces of possible
post-mortem intersubjectivity in Heidegger’s Being and Time, these traces do not possess a root
system that will bear the fruit we seek. Using Heidegger’s skillful distinction between the ontic
everyday and the ontologically unique aspects of death, as well as the path he sets out (but does
not follow) towards a phenomenal being with the dead, we will attempt to locate a ground from
which we can make sense of an earthly afterlife.
The points of divergence that I have gestured to in Heidegger’s account of the death of
the other have caused us to rethink two important foundational elements: first, the deceased’s
interrelation with my own Dasein and second, the radical uniqueness of the other. These two
elements will be explored in this thesis through a vital reimagining of subjectivity and
intersubjectivity.
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Using Heidegger’s model of Dasein as simultaneously existing in all three temporal
modes of past, present, and future, this paper will set out a subject that moves fluidly in these
three temporal directions. This subject will prove to be constituted by the present physical body,
the future oriented connection to the earth, and past memories. This notion of subjectivity will be
set out in the first chapter with guidance from Henri Bergson, Emmanuel Levinas, Luce Irigaray,
and Hannah Arendt. In the second chapter, we will return to the death of the other and posit that
this notion of the subject is founded on intersubjectivity. The future-oriented connection to the
earth is given to us as a recognizable world by the natality with the other, the physical body is
made present by the caress between the I and the other, and the memories of the past are
illuminated by the language I share with the other. The subject as constituted by intersubjectivity
will allow for us to investigate how the other lives on upon the earth after death. In the
conclusion, we will explore how an intersubjectivity so conceived manifests in
phenomenological lived experience. Through an exploration of art, I show that we witness the
dead as very much alive in our day to day lives.
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Chapter One: Subjectivity
“He allowed himself to be swayed by his conviction that human beings are not born once and for
all on the day their mothers give birth to them, but that life obliges them over and over again to
give birth to themselves.”
-

Love in the Time of Cholera, Gabriel Garcia Marquez

In this first portion of our exploration into the earthly afterlife of humans, we will aim to
explicate a subjectivity that consists of body, earth, and memory. Beginning with that which is
physically smallest: the human body. We will then move outwards explaining the connection
between the radically individual human body and the entirety of the earth and by extension, the
world. Finally, on a metaphysical level, interweaving a tapestry between individual human
bodies and the surrounding earth, memory completes subjectivity. In this way, the subject will
prove to be temporal in nature, as I will argue that each of these three facets of humans is the
physical and metaphysical reification of the three temporal modes of present, future and past.
This subject moves dynamically in all three temporal modes: through the body into the present,
through the earth into the future, and through memory into the past. The final portion of this
chapter demonstrates the subject as inherently temporal, and posits how this temporal subject fits
into the history of philosophy, and how a subject can move in all three temporal directions.
The Body: Present
“The secret of health for both mind and body is not to mourn for the past, nor to worry
about the future, but to live the present moment wisely and earnestly.”
-

Bukkyo Derdo Kyokai, The Teaching of Buddha
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The first aspect of subjectivity is the human body, the likes of which offers a physical
enclosure for the subject. I set out the body as physical object and as lived phenomenological
image; unpack how it is a reification of the temporal mode of the present; and how it is linked to
the earth and memory. The body as physical object marks the boundaries of who we are
individually and houses that which we see as more than merely physical (namely, the soul or the
mind, depending on one’s theoretical inclinations). It distinguishes us from the surrounding earth
and acts as the gathering point of our memories. Husserl establishes the constitution of space
from “the zero-point of orientation, which is one’s own body. My body is the absolute here of
orientation.”20
The body is also the sensual vehicle through which we experience. It includes what
phenomenologists have distinguished as the flesh. Phenomenologists such as Maurice MerleauPonty,21 and Jean-Luc Marion22 distinguish the physical body as object from the sensual flesh as
subject. This flesh aspect of the body allows us to feel the afternoon sunlight on our hands, to
taste the warm pang of fresh coffee, to hear Glen Gould’s Goldberg Variations, to smell freshly
cut grass. But more than merely passive, the flesh acts: the cheek can move against the hand
warmed from the sun, the lips wrap around the rim of the coffee mug, the voice hums and grunts
along with the piano’s chords. This paper will recognize the body as both the body and the flesh,
the subject and the object.

Explained in: Cristian Ciocan, “The Question of the Living Body in Heidegger’s
Analytic of Dasein,” Research in Phenomenology 38 (2008): 80.
21
See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Intertwining—The Chiasm,” in The Visible and the
Invisible, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis, 130-156 (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1968).
22
See Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena, trans. Vincent
Berraud and Robyn Horner (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 88-90.
20
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From birth to death, we are subjects because we have physical bodies. The body is the
source and receptacle of our laughter, love, tears, hatred and memories. And although this is a
project that is looking precisely at what happens after the body no longer holds the subject, it is
pivotal to note that it is only through a physical body that subjectivity is possible and it is only
through the bodies of others that our subjectivity continues on in an earthly afterlife. Subjectivity
requires a physical body.
The concrete reality of our body is recognized by Levinas, who states, “I exist as a body,
that is, as raised up, an organ that will be able to grasp and consequently place itself, in this
world on which I depend, before ends technically realizable.”23 Through the body, we are acted
upon, we receive. But more importantly for Levinas’ ethics, through the body we can act; we can
give. It is not a free and separate soul or mind that pushes us to act, but rather the entire ecosystem of the body. The stomach’s churning is already happening before our mind realizes that
something is dangerous or uncomfortable; the head is already aching when we realize that we are
doing too much; the heart literally aches when we lose love; a close friend tells us something
about ourselves that never occurred to our mind, but we already knew in every fiber of our body.
There is no definitive split between our body and mind because they are parts of one whole. My
senses and my mind interact and create together. In this way, they make up the object that is my
body.
The all-too-human feeble body is that which makes life precious. The distinct and
devastatingly breakable human body offers our autonomous subjectivity a limited time on the
earth. Levinas claims that “[t]he body naked and indigent is the very reverting, irreducible to a
thought, of representation into life, of the subjectivity that represents into life which is sustained
23

Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 2013), 117.
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by these representations and lives of them; its indigence- its needs- to affirm “exteriority” as
non-constituted, prior to all affirmation.”24 This delicate compilation of flesh and bones creates,
casts, and houses representations: It projects a world from itself in the Kantian sense. It is only
through these fallible organs that we have memories, that we have subjectivity. The body, as we
will posit it in this work, is first and foremost, the material flesh and bones. But of course, it is
also our own phenomenological perception of this flesh and bones. It is an image in a world of
images that we perceive as human subjects. The body is not just an object, but also a lived
phenomenological experience.
When a part of the body is severed or lost due to an illness or an accident, it is no longer a
part of our subjectivity because it can no longer act as a vehicle of our experience. If detached,
the finger no longer feels the sun, just as a severed ear is no longer the subject’s means of
hearing music. A lost limb is no longer an extension of our subjectivity. Conversely, in cases of
phantom limbs, the subject can feel the presence of the missing body part, although they do not
feel that body part as it physically exists in the world. For example, the soldier does not feel the
limb as detached, burnt and decomposing on the battlefield, but rather feels the perception or
image of the limb as it was when attached to the body. The amputee without legs feels
unbearable pain in the toes. This experience of phantom limbs reported amongst amputees is an
example of the liminality between the body as physical object and the body as image. We will
distinguish this difference between physical body and image.
When a person dies, the entirety of the physical body no longer houses her subjectivity.
Mourners look upon the deceased body of a loved one and note that their beloved is no longer
present. The failed heart, the cancerous lung, or the ruptured spleen make the body inhospitable
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for subjectivity and so these dimensions that are the only reified encounters we can experience of
the subject are gone. But it behooves us to mention that the rites of the dead and the ritual around
the body of the deceased is incredibly important for a sense of closure to family and friends.
Harrison notes that it is crucial for the living to bury the dead: “The missing body meant that the
deceased person was fated to remain, in effect, undead- a condition, once again, that speaks
above all of the open-ended, unreconciled psychic state of the grievers.”25 This observation that
putting the deceased body to rest is a necessary element of the mourning process further exhibits
the confusion and overlapping of the body as physical object and as lived image. The mourners
recognize that the deceased no longer inhabits the physical frame, but as an amputee feels pains
in the location of a severed limb, the mourner feels the object of the dead body as a container of
the deceased person’s spirit.
The body as image reaches beyond the physical object of the body and into the
phenomenological realm. Placed in the wide world around us and surrounded by innumerable
images of both objects and other subjects, Bergson claims that it is my body, among all other
images, that is special; “I call matter the aggregate of images, and perception of matter these
same images referred to the eventual action of one particular image, my body.”26 For Bergson,
the aggregate of images is the matter that surrounds us. It is the material world. My own body is
numbered amongst these images, but it holds a privileged position. As the one image that allows
us to perceive all other images, the body is the image par excellence. “My body is then, in the
aggregate of the material world, an image which acts like other images, receiving and giving
back movement, with perhaps, this difference only, that my body appears to choose, within
25
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certain limits, the manner in which it shall restore what it receives.”27 This notion fits into the
idiom: we see what we want to see. We take in the world through our own distinct sensual
reception and furthermore, filter what the senses show us through our own memories or
preconceived notions of what we think is happening. It is commonly noted that five people will
give as many different accounts of a particular event and this is because we see the world
through our own personal lens. We should note that while the will (or mind or soul) is a facet of
this lens, is not necessarily the free choice of the person’s mind. The body that has experienced
violence and cruelty will see through a lens very different than the body that has only been
shown kindness and affection. The body that has lived next to nature will see the world very
differently than the body that has only known concrete and artificial grass. The body that lives in
solitude will perceive the world’s images differently than that which lives in a community. The
body that kisses, that communicates, that takes in art, that stubs its toe, and a thousand other tiny
and giant conscious and unconscious actions and memories determine the choices that my body
makes. The body as an image, as the image, is a lived phenomenological force through which the
will chooses images and creates a way of being in the world. Thus while the body is an object,
our experience of the body (as body and flesh) is always also as a privileged image, as the
phenomenological entity.
When we think of the body physically and phenomenologically in time, it bears the
marks of our past28 (scraped knees and smile lines around the eyes), and prepares for our future
(tensing before a fall), but more than anything else, the body demands of us to be in the present.
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Bergson refers to “the body as an ever advancing boundary between the future and the past.”29
As the point between past and future, the Bergsonian body as a conductor in the flux of time
always finds itself in the center of the ever moving present.30 It is one step ahead of the actions
just performed, the thoughts just considered, and one step behind those actions and thoughts
about to happen. It exists in the pure present or the duration, monitoring the actions that the body
itself will take and the actions that will be inflicted upon the body by outside forces. The body is
the key to the present moment. When the mind wanders away dreaming of the future or
reflecting upon the past, it is the sensual body that draws me back: I stub a toe, I smell cookies, I
hear the doorbell. I am drawn into the present by the senses. The ancient Eastern art of
meditation is often as simple (and difficult) as following the breath: pause; inhale; pause;
exhale... repeat. In this way, meditation utilizes the body’s proclivity to bring the human into the
present moment.
The body is intrinsically connected to the earth. We walk, build, and dwell upon the
earth. Referred to as a mother, the earth provides humans with a home, but furthermore, has
created the conditions for the possibility of human life, and has brought forth the human race.
The earth offers us sustenance. In his later essays, Heidegger explains that the earth “is that
which comes forth and shelters.”31 For humans to be able “to set something free into its own
essence”, and also, “to initiate their own essential being- their being capable of death as death,”
which Heidegger sees as the highest potential of Dasein, the human requires the sheltering
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ground of the earth.32 The earth is the essential ground (both physically and phenomenologically)
of the human body.
For Bergson, “my body constitutes at every moment… a section of the universal
becoming.”33 While the body is a privileged image, a system unto itself, it is also a part of a
larger whole: the universe. This can be argued in a strictly material way when we consider the
creation of our solar system by the collision of stony iron that gradually built up planets,
including the earth, from which eventually plants, animals, and humans emerged. In incredibly
simple terms, we are made up of the same matter as the earth’s core, which in turn is made up of
the same matter as the solar system, which comes from the same matter that exploded in a big
bang, creating the universe as a whole. There is not an atom in our bodies that was not forged in
the surface of the sun. Materially, we are intricately connected to the universe, and particularly to
the earth, which has provided us with the means of natality.
On a phenomenological level, our body is not separate from the images of the material
world, but is one of them; “Itself an image, the body cannot store up images, since it forms a part
of the images, and this is why it is a chimerical enterprise to seek to localize past or even present
perceptions in the brain: they are not in it; it is the brain that is in them.”34 As an image among
the many images of the material world, the body as conductor is itself an image created through
memories. Bergson describes it as a place of passage, a copula, as such. It is a link between the
past memories and the future-oriented perceptions of and actions upon the earth. Fluid and
dynamic, we must not mistake the body as controlling the system or above the images of the
earth.
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In relation to memory, the body is the container of our memories, and it is contained
within our memories. It is not the controller of the represented universe, but rather, it is
controlled by the universe that it represents. The body as interlocutor and as copula works with
its will, mind, or spirit to call upon memories. These memories live in the recesses of our body.
The smell of a flower is an external stimulus, but it mixes with my own body and calls forth a
memory. My will sifts through intensities and places, until the memory arrives from the past into
my present body. If the flowery smell evokes a high school sweetheart, perhaps the memory sits
lightly in the chest, if it evokes a funeral, perhaps it sits heavy and low in the bowels. The
memories of the past mix with the body.
The human body as a physical object and phenomenologically privileged image acts as a
vehicle for our own subjectivity in the present moment. It is grounded upon the earth and reaches
out towards the earth’s matter in a future-oriented drive and it is fueled by the memories that
cause it to reach back into the past. It stands between the past memory and the future earthly
matter, as it opens the human experience in the present moment.
The Earth: Future
If we surrendered
to earth’s intelligence
we could rise up rooted, like trees.
Instead we entangle ourselves
in knots of our own making
and struggle, lonely and confused.
So like children, we begin again...
to fall,
patiently to trust our heaviness.
Even a bird has to do that
before he can fly.
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― Rainer Maria Rilke, Rilke's Book of Hours: Love Poems to God

In this next portion of subjectivity, we will turn to the importance of the earth in the
assemblage of the subject. We will examine how and why we currently exist in a state of
alienation from the earth and distinguish between the cyclical earth and the unique world; link
the earth to the human body and to memory; and finally, draw connections between the earth and
our forward moving drive into the future.
But is it possible to conceive the nervous system as living apart from the organism
which nourishes it, from the atmosphere in which the organism breathes, from the
earth which that atmosphere envelopes, from the sun round which the earth
revolves? More generally, does not the fiction of an isolated material object imply
a kind of absurdity, since this object borrows its physical properties from the
relations which it maintains with all others, and owes each of its determinations,
and consequently, its very existence, to the place which it occupies in the universe
as a whole? 35
In the above quotation, Bergson argues that the human body cannot be considered as an
autonomous individuated entity, but rather as part of the larger eco-system that is our earth.
While this link between human and earth is fairly simple, it can nonetheless be difficult for us to
cognize because of two reasons: first, we have come to accept a traditional Cartesian subjectivity
and thus have a difficult time feeling connected or having knowledge of anything outside of
ourselves and; second, because we often feel a sense of alienation. It is not easy to recognize a
subjectivity consisting of the earth when we feel alone in the world. Arendt describes this
modern alienation as stemming from a “two fold flight from the earth into the universe and from
the world into the self.”36 She sees humanity in the Cold War era race to space as eagerly
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attempting to flee the only environment hospitable to humans, to transcend that which is human,
that which has created, sheltered and nourished human beings. We are so eager to move forward
and dominate outer space, that we are not taking care of or even recognizing, let alone nurturing,
that which we fundamentally are: the earth.
Arendt distinguishes a difference between the physical earth and the human made world:
the earth is the physical domain upon which humans live and which subjects humans to a
continually recurring cycle; the world on the other hand, is the human artifice, which creates a
lasting stability for humans to live on after death. It is in the world and not the earth that the
second flight from the self occurs. The human begins to dissolve into the private sphere, turning
away from public discourse and instead turning to the private realm of the social, which is often
aired in public but is filled with banal private content. In this two-fold way, humans see
themselves as singular Cartesian subjects who flee the earth inwardly (into the self) and
outwardly (into outer space), ultimately creating a profound sense of alienation from that which
creates, molds, and nurtures human existence. Thus, while humans are physically of the earth as
Bergson and Arendt suggest, Arendt claims that they are also in the midst of a modern discourse
that promotes fleeing the earth. In this work, I will posit that the world is a product of the human
condition, and the earth is that which creates the human condition or our subjectivity.
In his essay, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger sets out the earth and
the world as bound in a continual productive strife.37 They are “essentially different from

Additionally, in his lecture given in 1951 and subsequent essay entitled, “Building
Dwelling Thinking,” Martin Heidegger explains the human being as a member of something he
calls the fourfold. There are four elements normally considered separate that Heidegger posits as
one; namely earth, sky, divinities, and mortals. These four things equi-primordially constitute
one another in a way that unites them as a four-fold, which amounts to one whole rather than
four separate entities. I would argue that the fourfold is ontologically determined in the very
fabric of existence for Heidegger, but our upholding the fourfold and properly recognizing our
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one another and yet are never separated.”38 Similar to Arendt,39 the earth is the sheltering
and concealing force that is “essentially undisclosable”40, cyclical, and dynamic, whereas
the world is the setting out of history and unique human creativity. Heidegger claims that
earth and world “raise each other into the self-assertion of their essential natures.”41 We
can understand this relation to the earth as similar to Heidegger’s relationship to Being.
The call of Being, which Dasein hears in silence and which allows Dasein to exist
authentically42 in the text Being and Time, here becomes the “silent call of the earth.”43 It
is an openness to the earth that allows the human to create a world. In a listening and
silence that allows the earth to be heard but unreified, humans can create a world. Thus
the dance between the earth and the world is the dance between Being and beings. It is
the continual strife that marks the two as distinct but inseparable. So when we speak of
the earth in this thesis, the world is a natural implication. As humans, we create worlds,
we perceive, and make narratives and histories to understand. Thus, I will specify when I
refer to the world rather than the earth, but both are always implied.
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We are of the earth, but the earth is also of us. Harrison furthers this argument with the
question: “Because the earth has reabsorbed the dead into its elements for so many millions upon
millions of years, who can any longer tell the difference between receptacle and contents?”44 It is
not commonly noted in Western narratives, as it is in traditional aboriginal ones, but when we
walk upon the earth, we walk upon our ancestors. Those we loved, those we hated, those known
and unknown who have come before us are literally the ground on which we stand. The earth is
our history and we in turn will become the earth for generations to come.
The line between the physical and the metaphysical connection between the body and the
earth necessarily begins to blur. The physical body returns to the earth; the earth shelters the
living physical body; the body as image endows the earth with a world; the earthly world gives
the body as image history and collective memory. Physically, we need the earth to survive.
Metaphysically, the earth upholds and stores our historical past and makes available to us the
possibility of our future. We are herein reminded of Arsic’s suggestion that the real and the
irrational or metaphorical can indeed be the same thing, or that our day to day lives and not just
literature, can be imbued with magical realism.45 The meaning structures and symbols are built
upon the physical realities and the materiality of these realities is in turn reinforced by the
symbols. Harrison further argues that it is through the connection to the earth that subjectivity
has the possibility to continue after life:
It is only because their bodies have a place to go that their souls or images or
words may attain an afterlife of sorts among the living. We should be infinitely
grateful, therefore, for the hiding and receiving power of this terracqueous globe,
which Michel Serres, reflecting on the image of Jules Verne’s dog, rightly calls “
a tabernacle, a receptacle for all decompositions.”46

44

Harrison, Dominion, 1.
Arsic, 3.
46
Ibid.
45

Lawson 26

The body is housed in the earth after death and as such, the earth becomes the reminder of the
deceased. This is why, as mentioned in the introduction, artists and poets can find the deceased
everywhere in the surrounding earth. The deceased subject literally and figuratively becomes the
tall grass and the autumn rain.
Arendt links this vitalist philosophy of natural life to the Nietzschean eternal return47 in a
continual recycling of matter, renewal and decay, as an earth in which everything, quite literally,
materially continues to happen over and over again. But Arendt notes that the exception to this
Nietzschean assertion of eternal return is the individual human life. While the matter of the earth
is forever recycled and recurring, a specific human is only once. Through her world-making
capabilities, the human has the ability to stand out from the flow of eternal recurrence and create
something genuinely new. This is evident in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra when the shepherd bites off
the head of a snake that has crept down his throat: “he bit with a good bite! He spat far away the
snake’s head - and sprang up. No longer a shepherd, no longer a man, a transformed being
surrounded by light, laughing! Never yet on earth had any man laughed as he had laughed.”48
Nietzsche alerts his reader that the Shepard’s tale is an allegory, a riddle that must be solved:
“Solve for me this riddle that I saw, interpret to me the vision of the most solitary man.”49
Arendt’s analysis of the eternal return is a possible answer to this riddle. The snake or the
ouroboros is the embodiment of the eternal return and by grabbing onto the shepherd, it demands
he take part in the material natural recurrence of all life. Fearful and unable to free himself, the
shepherd is prepared to move from life to death, attached to the snake that eats its own tail. But
instead, the shepherd, upon Zarathustra’s urging, defies the eternal return and steps out into the
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action of human kind in a laughter that is genuinely new. So while nature or the earth continues
on forever in an eternal return, the human being in the world has the possibility of stepping out
of this return for the short span between birth and death and creating something genuinely new
through action, speech and thought.
The paradox of being a human is that we are necessarily eternal recurrence but also
radically unique and unrepeatable. We are a part of the earth’s cycle but also have moments
where we stand out apart from that cycle in the world. As the material of the earth, forever
recycling back into itself, humans are bound to recur eternally. But despite this, they are
simultaneously radically unique, and never to recur. This paradox reveals a profound ontological
difference between subject as individuated worldly flesh and subject as cyclical earthly body. But
rather than taking these two aspects of subjectivity as mutually exclusive, they must be
understood as a very real and necessary part of the human condition. We are both the cycle of the
earth and the distinct individual person.
In its connection to the earth, subjectivity continues on after the death of the human body.
The earth makes the dissolution process of the subject gradual and impossible to complete. Born
onto the earth amongst others, when the human body perishes, the subject changes dramatically.
No longer bound by a human bodily form and no longer capable of the autonomy of voice,
movement, and action, which we associate with traditional Western subjectivity, the subject
transitions into the earth by fire, by water, by decomposition. The body becomes earth. The
unique and individual aspects of the subject continue on in those who knew that person well. If
someone has been famous in life, perhaps they carry on a long time, such as with Ulysses, or
Janis Joplin, but regardless, eventually the last person who directly knew the subject will die and
the particulars of that person will either fade completely or become the stuff of legend and reflect
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very little of their personal identity. However, this is still not the end of the subject because they
have affected numerous people in a myriad of ways, the influences of which have affected how
these people act upon the earth. For example, the deceased subject affects her best friend upon
the earth. The best friend, in turn, is fueled by her friend’s love or humor as she interacts with her
nephew. Her nephew in turn receives that humor and love and passes it along to his students
when he grows up and becomes a teacher. The humor and love of the deceased continues on.
This can go on for decades or even centuries, until eventually an end occurs, where the subject
completely dissolves into pure materiality. Harrison explains this notion of end through
architectural ruins: “Ruins in an advanced state of ruination represent, or better they literally
embody, the dissolution of meaning into matter.” 50 All metaphysical ideals and meaning
structures will eventually decay, they will become mere matter from which new meaning
emerges.
Perhaps the most poetic example of the body’s physical continuation upon the earth
comes not from the human animal and not from our great literature, but from the biological
example of Whale Fall. When a cetacea dies over oceanic areas with maximal depth, it falls into
the permanently black abyssal zone amongst the elusive deep sea giant squid and the giant tube
worm. Due to the cold temperatures, high pressure, and scarcity of scavengers in this abyss, the
whale body becomes a complex localized ecosystem that supplies sustenance to deep-sea
organisms for decades. It lives on. It grows and gives until eventually, the whale body itself
becomes devoid of all life giving capacity and exists as mere ruins.
As the source of our stimuli, the earth informs our senses of particular memories.
Bergson explains, “I smell a rose and immediately confused recollections of childhood come
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back to my memory. In truth, these recollections have not been called up by the perfume of the
rose: I breathe them in with the very scent; it means all that to me.”51 In this passage, we
explicitly come to the connection between individual human body, material earth, and memory.
It is not that the aroma of the rose is an external object that triggers in the subject a memory of
childhood, but rather, the rose is the memory. A good friend and brother-in-law of Bergson,
Proust famously uses this combination of earth, subject, and memory in Swann’s Way when a
grown Marcel is transported back to his childhood home as he drinks a cup of tea infused with a
madeleine cookie:
And once I had recognized the taste of the crumb of madeleine soaked in her
decoction of lime-flowers which my aunt used to give me (although I did not yet
know and must long postpone the discovery of why this memory made me so
happy) immediately the old grey house upon the street, where her room was, rose
up like the scenery of a theatre to attach itself to the little pavilion, opening on to
the garden, which had been built out behind it for my parents (the isolated panel
which until that moment had been all that I could see); and with the house the
town, from morning to night and in all weathers, the Square where I was sent
before luncheon, the streets along which I used to run errands, the country roads
we took when it was fine. And just as the Japanese amuse themselves by filling a
porcelain bowl with water and steeping in it little crumbs of paper which until
then are without character or form, but, the moment they become wet, stretch
themselves and bend, take on colour and distinctive shape, become flowers or
houses or people, permanent and recognisable, so in that moment all the flowers
in our garden and in M. Swann’s park, and the water-lilies on the Vivonne and the
good folk of the village and their little dwellings and the parish church and the
whole of Combray and of its surroundings, taking their proper shapes and
growing solid, sprang into being, town and gardens alike, from my cup of tea.52
I have quoted Proust at length here because not only is it a beautifully written reflection,
but it furthermore links the discourse of memory, earth and body as a dynamic process
that moves in all directions. The taste of the tea affects the body, the memory affects the
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taste of the tea, the body affects the structure of the memory, the memory affects the
body, the taste of the tea affects the memory, the body affects the tea. There is a swirling
dynamic at play in this passage where a memory emerges from the continual interplay of
all three.
The earth holds our past memories and unfolds for us in the present by interacting
with our sensual body. But more than this, the earth offers our future. As that which is me
but is also beyond my personal individual body, the paradoxical connection to the earth
constitutes that yearning towards a future beyond myself that is never fully graspable in
my varying states of alienation. The material bodies or objects of the earth are that which
offer a ground for the world. In the world, I am driven toward my future projects and
affairs. The surrounding material objects ignite in me a Hedeggerian desire to continually
plan for the future.53 The forest may be a future residence, the material for building a
home, or the inspiration for a painting. In a myriad of ways, the surrounding earth drives
the subject forward into futuration. The goals and ambitions of the subject, in short, his or
her future oriented drive is informed by the world. It is in the world that we find the
subject’s futural mode or drive toward the future.
As noted above, the world is special because it is unique. It steps outside of the
cycle of earth precisely because the human is radically unique and has a limited time
upon the earth. The earth, as a stable recurring entity, unknowable and unreifiable is itself
the marker of human time. Against the earth, the world of history is possible because of
the earth’s relative unchanging nature. As the gestalt image that is now a beautiful young
lady, now a haggard old woman, the earth offers us the notion of time immemorial
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against which springs forth the possibility of a distinct world. This interplay of earth and
world drives the human towards the future. The constant presence of the cyclical earth
and the human body’s return to that cycle acts as a baseline for our lives. It is the deep
resonating sound of the Hindu and Buddhist “auhm,” the universal sound of all existence
that calls and demands we pay heed. We hear this resonating sound in the overture to
Wagner’s opera “Das Rheingold,” the first of his ring cycle. Harrison notes that this
elemental chord signifies the Rhine river “prior to the advent of gods and humans.”54
From this drone, we recognize our own inherent link to the cyclical earth’s temporality,
but also our possibility of human temporality: the potential to stand out between our birth
and our imminent death as something wholly unique. The earth’s drone and the gestalt
image of the world that springs forth (and often dominates our day to day experience)
drives us to act, to create, to distinguish ourselves in some way before our death. The
strife of the earth and world is the force that implores the human subject to move toward
the future, which will culminate in his or her own death. The earth/ world is the future.
The earth does not merely support the subject, but is the subject both physically
and metaphysically. The earth constitutes the physical make-up of the subject and it also
holds the subject’s memories quite apart from the individual human body. The body is
star dust and the rose is memory: I am the earth/ world, but so too is the earth/ world me.
Driving me toward the future, the earth/world constitutes my motivation towards the
projects and goals that shape my very being. The earth is future, the earth is the subject.
With this in mind, we can now move into an exploration of memory as it works alongside
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the body and the earth to constitute what we will here take as the assemblage of
subjectivity.
Memory: Past
As the final aspect of the subject, memory links into body and earth and connects
the physical to the metaphysical. Because we have already set out the links between
memory and body, as well as memory and earth, we will unpack memory and briefly
touch upon how all three aspects link together and then reflect upon memory as a
movement into the past. This movement into the past via memory will lead us to question
traditional Western notions of temporality and ultimately to ask why the subject set out is
made of these three aspects and how such a subject is temporally liminal.
In Matter and Memory, Bergson argues that “memory… is just the intersection of
mind and matter.”55 Let us consider mind to be the individual human body and matter to
be the totality of the earth upon which we dwell. Memory illuminates the crossroads of
these two, drawing now upon earth, now upon body, weaving a narrative by which we
live our lives. Embodied in a corporeal form, the ever-changing human subject moves
along the plane of the earth and is constituted, guided and structured by an ever flowing
cone of memories that draws from recent, prominent experiences, but also reaches farther
up into the more remote memories such as Marcel’s madeleine or Bergson’s rose.
This undulating, breathing, pranic cone of memory constitutes the human subject.
Bergson notes that it is not the memory of mere repetition or habit, the muscle memory,
but rather another type of memory, the memory that imagines:
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To call up the past in the form of an image, we must be able to withdraw
ourselves from the action of the moment, we must have the power to value the
useless, we must have the will to dream. Man alone is capable of such an effort,
but even in him the past to which he returns is fugitive, ever on the point of
escaping him, as though his backward turning memory were thwarted by the
other, more natural memory, of which the forward movement bears him to action
and to life.56

It is not the action oriented memory of forward flowing habit and repetition that
distinguishes the human as a unique subject, but rather the backward glancing memory of
imagination. Bergson’s notion of memory draws parallels to Arendt’s notion of thinking:
thinking always deals with objects that are absent, removed from direct sense
perception. An object of thought is always a re-presentation, that is, something or
somebody that is actually absent and present only to the mind which, by virtue of
imagination, can make it present in the form of an image.57
Bergsonian memory is akin to Arendtian thought in that they are a backward flow of
time. Both are a movement away from the forward thrusting into the future, which
instead turns back on itself. They are forms of reflection, and indeed, for Arendt, this act
of reflection marks the pinnacle of the human condition. Recall that Arendt charged
Adolf Eichmann, the Nazi responsible for transporting thousands of Jews to their deaths
during the Second World War, not as inherently wicked, but as thoughtless. His inability
to think is what Arendt deemed “the banality of evil.”58
I bring Arendt’s voice to the conversation because she helps to justify the need to
move in alternative temporal directions. With Bergson alone, it is easy to see the
subject’s movement into the past as sentimental or even maudlin, rather than as a
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productive and necessary aspect of human subjectivity. Arendt claims that the human
need to think leaves nothing tangible behind59 and deals with things absent or invisible
and seems to us to be “out of order.”60 But it is the disordered unworldly act of thinking
that “may prevent catastrophes… in the rare moments when the chips are down.”61 Our
ability to move temporally backwards marks our saving grace for Arendt. It is all we have
as a shield against the unthinking, violent forward flow of human time. Nor is memory
always a pleasurable and nostalgic vehicle. Following his world worn but not broken
protagonist Sisyphus, Camus argues that memory can be a heavy burden:
I fancy Sisyphus returning towards his rock, and the sorrows in the beginning.
When the images of earth cling too tightly to memory, when the call of happiness
becomes too insistent, it happens that melancholy rises in man’s heart; this is the
rock’s victory, this is the rock itself.62
Memory holds a danger of nostalgia, of becoming lost in what might have been. It can be
the very rock that asks us to eternally climb and push if we allow it to take over. This is
why we cannot move solely towards the past.
As I have shown through the three facets of human subjectivity, this notion of a
dynamic temporality is key to the subjectivity I have set forth. This subject is constituted
by and moves in each temporal direction. The body is the subject and opens in the
present. The earth/ world is the subject and drives into the future. Memory is the subject
and draws back into the past. Each are distinct aspects and temporal modes of our
subjectivity, and yet they all contain one another. Although all modes are always active,
only one of the three is the primary mode of a subject at a given time. For example, as I
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stir wine into my risotto, I am taken up in a future-oriented project of sustaining and
entertaining myself and my friends. But so too do I sip the cooking wine and find myself
sensually stimulated in the present. Stirring the rice, my mind leaves this present and I am
drawn back towards memories of sipping wine and cooking risotto with friends and
lovers from the past. In this case, my action is future oriented, but it is supported and
shared by the present and the past. Because this point of “time” has emerged as the under
current and force of the subjectivity in this thesis, let us further probe this “out of order”
dynamic flow of temporality as it constitutes the human subject.
The Subject as Temporality
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
Through the unknown, remembered gate
When the last of earth left to discover
Is that which was the beginning;
At the source of the longest river
The voice of the hidden waterfall
And the children in the apple-tree
Not known, because not looked for
But heard, half-heard, in the stillness
Between two waves of the sea.
Quick now, here, now, always—
A condition of complete simplicity
(Costing not less than everything)
-

T.S. Eliot, “Little Gidding” in Four Quartets

In order to understand Arendt’s “out of order” thought and what Bergson is
attempting to do with memory, let us consider the flow of time from past to future:
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Traditionally, in Western philosophical thought we consider time to move in a linear
direction from past towards future.

This lends itself to a teleological view of time, with a clear beginning and a clear end. It
is the worldly human temporality that stands out against the earth’s cycles. As
Shakespeare expresses in As You Like It, within the span of a life each human “plays
many parts, /His acts being seven ages.”63 For the human, time moves with certainty from
infancy to school days, to love, to war, to justice, to old age and finally ends in a “second
childishness and mere oblivion; Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything.”64 Each
human has the possibility (though not the guarantee) of living out these seven stages and
no person is granted the freedom to reverse this flow or experience these acts in any order
but that which is set out by the constant forward flow of linear temporality. Of course,
this is an undeniable truth: no person can turn back time and no human can defy death.
However, this is not the whole truth nor the end of the story and Bergson complicates this
flow of time.
Our memories simultaneously draw together the past and the future,
opening up the present moment, the now. Bergson explains that past and future must be
drawn upon simultaneously and in equality:
It may be said that we have no grasp of the future without an equal and
corresponding outlook over the past, that the onrush of our activity makes a void
63
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behind it into which memories flow, and that memory is the reverberation, in the
sphere of consciousness, of the indetermination of our will.65
For Bergson, time is dynamic, circling and drawing from both past and future to
open up a space of being in the present. Neither past, present, nor future is favored, but
each is considered equal and simultaneously opening. The three modes of time open up
as one, they act as one. Furthermore, time can flow equally in all three directions. Now
time flows forward, now back, now it opens in the present. For Bergson, the temporality
on which the subject is founded is based upon all three acts of time and flows in all three
directions.
In the philosophical tradition, time has been an important way of understanding
the human condition, particularly in modern continental thought. Since Kant’s assertion
in his Critique of Pure Reason that time is the key to our inner world and the internal
apparatus through which we access the outer world, time has been a key concept in
understanding our human experience.66 In this section of subjectivity, we will examine
how the subject must be understood as moving in all three temporal directions and how
Bergson ultimately fails in achieving such a movement. We will set out Heidegger’s
temporal movement as an inversion of the Bergsonian model and argue that neither past
nor future must take predominance in the flow of human temporality.
The construct of human time is tightly linked to our conception of the human
condition. Why does philosophy see the subject as inherently temporal? Robert Harrison
explains that if “to be human means to translate our mortality into history, as I believe it
does, then one could say that the ethos or dwelling place of humanity remains mortal
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time, which we transmute into historical durations that are themselves radically finite. We
are through and through temporal in character, that is, finite, in our mode of being.”67 In
the Heideggerian sense, the human condition is a process of establishing our own
temporality as distinct from the earth. This temporality does not simply characterize, but
constitutes the human. The human subject is a distinct form of temporality, which
through body as present opening, earth as future flowing, and memory as past reflecting,
creates the world in which we live.
As mentioned above, Bergson aims to posit a subject who moves freely in all
three temporal directions. Cassirer explains that for Bergson, “in the intuition of time, the
three stages, past, present, and future, are given to us as an immediate unity in which no
stage is differently evaluated from the others. No phase is singled out as the genuine, true,
original stage- for all three are equally given in the simple meaning of time.”68 But
Cassirer questions Bergson as to whether this claim is actually substantiated in Bergson’s
temporal structure. Cassirer argues that despite Bergson’s attempts at a unitary
temporality, he ends up favoring the past, which ultimately destroys the multidimensional system of time that Bergson establishes:
If we take time not as a substantial but rather as a functional unity, as a function
of representation comprising a threefold sense of direction, none of its factors
may be detached from the whole without causing it to disintegrate as a whole. But
it is precisely such a detachment of one factor that gives Bergson’s metaphysics
its characteristic imprint. Fundamentally he recognizes only the past as originally
temporal, whereas the consciousness of the future does not belong to pure
temporal intuition.69
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This accusation is incredibly prescient to the analysis of Bergson that this thesis means to
put forward. Cassirer charges that the structure of Bergson’s temporality demands that it
be functionally equal and capable of moving in all three directions. But Bergson’s
emphasis on the past (via memory) as the only one of the three temporal structures (past,
present, and future) to construct the human subject means that ultimately, the
metaphysical structure of Bergson’s temporality is compromised. Again, Cassirer
explains;
Despite all of Bergson’s emphasis here on the “momentum of life,” on the “élan
vital,” a distinctive romantic-quietist feature enters into his theory. The looking
back into the past is philosophically transfigured: it is it alone that leads us into
the ultimate ground of the I and into the depths of speculative cognition. Any such
idealization is denied the direction toward the future: it has only a “pragmatic”
and no theoretical value. Is the future, however, always given to us only as the
aim of an immediate and, in the most restricted sense, practical effective action, or
must not a purely spiritual “looking forward” [Vorblick], an ideal element and
motive, underlie the effective action itself if it is to raise up to true force and
freedom?70
Thus, while Bergson attempts to set out a metaphysics of time that moves in all
three directions, he ultimately privileges the past and so his temporality can move only
backward, toward the past:

We can see this prioritization of the past via memory again and again in Bergson. As
such, memory reaches into the past as imaginative memory and habitual memory reaches
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back into the past in order to find the images to create a world and project into the future.
We can consider this as an adaptation of the Cartesian affirmation of existence: Memoro
ergo sum. I remember therefore I am. The subject is ontologically constituted by the past:
“Memory, inseparable in practice from perception, imports the past into the present,
contracts into a single intuition many moments of duration, and thus by a twofold
operation compels us, de facto, to perceive matter in ourselves, whereas we, de jure,
perceive matter within matter.”71 For Bergson, it is our memory of the past that links our
mind (individual body) to matter (the surrounding earth/ world) and acts as the tie that
binds. Memory is the force behind a Hegelian recognition of meaning in matter, in and
through matter as meaning.
Not only does the past constitute us as subjects for Bergson, it is also responsible
for the illumination of existence. The past epistemologically constitutes us in the present
moment by offering us knowledge and meaning; “it is from the present that the appeal to
which memory responds comes, and it is from the sensori-motor elements of present
action that a memory borrows the warmth which gives it life.”72 The body, in the present
moment, is activated, as it were, by an appeal to the past. We can imagine a body slightly
slumped, a mind on pause when a waft of cinnamon and apples drifts through the nostrils
of the stagnant subject and suddenly the subject is activated, illuminated, reaching into
the past, recollecting the childhood reward of hot apple cider after shoveling the snow
from the front drive. Through the memories brought on by senses, the subject moves
from mere matter to mind. In memory the subject lives and accesses the present moment.
The emphasis on memory and the past as it ontologically founds the subject and
71
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epistemologically gives the subject meaning leads to a recognition that Cassirer’s
criticism is correct. For all of his attempts at a multi-directional equi-primordial
temporality, Bergson privileges the past and the subject is solely founded upon an
inversion of the traditional flow of time. Time flows forever into what was, or as
Fitzgerald suggests at the conclusion of The Great Gatsby, “So we beat on, boats against
the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.”73
Thirty years later, Heidegger cultivated this idea of an equi-primordial
temporality in his text, Being and Time. Similar to Bergson, Heidegger sets out all three
acts of time together, but unlike Bergson, Heidegger unabashedly favors the future. For
Heidegger, time moves only forward. So while he sees the three ecstasies of time
occurring at once, the direction, like Shakespeare’s acts of life moves only toward
becoming “sans everything”: toward the own most possibility of my own death. In Being
and Time, the future and the knowledge of one’s own death constitutes the subject: “Thus
death reveals itself as one’s ownmost, nonrelational, and insuperable [unüberholbar]
possibility.”74
Heidegger admits that we often ignore the fact of our own death in our day to day
lives, but he holds that even when we are being deceitful with ourselves about the reality
of our own death, we are still very much aware that death can come for us at any time:
“this evasive covering over of death is not capable of being authentically ‘certain’ of
death, and yet it is.”75 Even when death is far from our minds, when we are young and
feel invincible, our knowledge that we can die guides our every action. Indeed, the more
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boldly we push aside the possibility of our death, the more it haunts us. Like Ebenezer
Scrooge, when we dismiss this ownmost possibility, we tuck into bed at night and are
haunted by the sight of our own grave stone. All that is certain in our life is that the grains
in our hour glass are not infinite. This being-toward-death suggests a favoring of the
future for Hediegger: “Here “future” does not mean a now that has not yet become
“actual” and that somehow will be for the first time, but the coming in which Dasein
comes toward itself in its ownmost potentiality-of-being.”76 The subject (or rather,
Dasein) is future oriented, but this future orientation takes part at the same time in past
and present. Continually driven forward by her ownmost possibility of death, Dasein
thrusts forward from past into the future and is drawn back into the present by the call of
Being, or the silent call of the earth:

Heidegger, then, offers us the same structure of temporality as Bergson, but moves in the
opposite direction. The three moments of time happen simultaneously, but the flow of
time is only future oriented.
As I have established, the movement of the subject in all three temporal directions
is what marks our human experience and makes us unique in a world of cyclical flow.
The flow forward into the future marks our creations and projects upon the earth and in
the world, the flow into the present marks a duration and Zen-like recognition of our
76
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place and connection in our body, and the flow into the past allows for reflection and
thought in the imaginative memory. If we hope to come to a true Bergsonian temporal
structure in which the subject can and does phenomenologically move in all three
temporal directions, we cannot use the constitution of the subject as memory (as does
Bergson: in order to move in any temporal direction, the subject must first and originarily
move back toward past memories) nor as death (as does Heidegger: the subject only
moves forward in a project-oriented drive that recognizes the possibility of its own
death). This thesis differs from both Bergson and Heidegger because no particular
temporal mode of the human takes predominance. Each moment holds all three temporal
modes and the subject moves phenomenologically in the modes of past, present, and
future. The subject, made of memory, earth, and body exists in the three equi-primordial
temporal moments. The subject’s time flows back into the past, into memory, which it
draws forward, projecting those memories into the earthly future and experiencing those
memories from the senses of the present. The subject’s time flows forward, called by the
aspects outside of it that constitute its own being, namely, wordly matters, built upon
earthly matter, which it draws back into memories and opens up in the corporeal present
moment through the sensual body. And finally, the subject’s time flows and opens in the
present moment, unfolding a duration that simultaneously gathers memory and
earth/world into its finite and all-too-human body. In each given moment, this subject not
only experiences all three modes of temporality in equality, but has the ability to move in
all three directions of time. Thus, we find ourselves with a unique and liminal temporal
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subject:

All three aspects of time make up the subject and realize a lucid and dynamic temporal
structure. So when Bergson claims that the body is “an ever advancing boundary between
the future and the past,”77 the picture of three flowing dynamic and interweaving aspects
of our subjectivity and modes of temporality begins to form as a brightly colored,
shimmering quilt flapping on a clothes line: singular in its particular body, its material
shape, but with patches made up of small bits and pieces of the surrounding earth and
world, and bound together by memories. The subjectivity we have unearthed is a tapestry
of memory.
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Chapter Two: Intersubjectivity
We die with the dying:
See, they depart, and we go with them.
We are born with the dead:
See, they return, and bring us with them.
-

“Little Gidding,”Four Quartets, T.S. Eliot

In the last chapter, we set out the subject as comprised of a body anchoring us into the
present, an earth as the condition of the future, and memory as the hearkening of the past. From
this we have a shifting, dynamic and liminal subjectivity that exists in all three moments of
temporality. But let us turn our attention once again to the death of the other, as this phenomenon
is the reason for undergoing our exploration and we have seemingly strayed. As we noted in the
introduction, the other continues on after her or his death. We find the other in the earth, in the
natural environment, which is a part of that person’s subjectivity. We feel his presence in the
summer sun across our face, in the flock of geese flying south across grey autumn skies, in the
bright flashing lights and noise downtown, in the wine bar he loved to frequent and the coffee
shop she was want to write in for hours at a time. Upon the death of the other, we find the other
not only in the earth, but also in ourselves. The mixture of a certain bottle of chardonnay with my
own deep inhale conjures the memory of the other. The other is imprinted not solely in the
common property that is the scent of chardonnay: another person will not experience this same
bewitching vision. But the memory of the other is not solely in my personal body or mind either,
as it was not by my own volition, but by the scent of the wine that the other was called into
presence. Imprinted upon me and upon the chardonnay, it is the mixture or the interplay of my
senses and the wine that conjures the other. Upon the death of the other, we find them in all
aspects of our subjectivity: in body, earth, and in memory. The death of the other reaches deep
into our being and ruptures a foundational tenet of our very world. The ground upon which we
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stand shifts and we change. Not superficially, but in the deepest way imaginable. It is a
cavernous change best described by Tony Kushner in his play Angels in America:
God splits the skin with a jagged thumbnail from throat to belly and then plunges
a huge filthy hand in, he grabs hold of your bloody tubes and they slip to evade
his grasp but he squeezes hard, he insists, he pulls and pulls till all your innards
are yanked out and the pain! We can't even talk about that. And then he stuffs
them back, dirty, tangled and torn. It's up to you to do the stitching. And then up
you get. And walk around. Just mangled guts pretending. That's how people
change.78
The experience of the other’s death causes us to realize that there is something incredibly unique
in our relationship to others. There is something originary about what happens between the I and
the other. We do not invite the other to join in our world, but rather, our world is created between
the self and the other. In the death of the other we realize the extent to which our world has been
colored and created not by our self but by the in-between that hinges on the input of the other. In
the death of the other we realize the chink in the armor of our own subjectivity as autonomous.79
Our bodies do not exist in rich sensual fullness until the other’s hand caresses us and opens us up
into the present moment. Our future does not roll out the earth before us until the life of the other
gives us something to plan for, to protect, and with whom we literally create a world. In our
shared language with the other, we create memories that allow us to move into the past. We are
not fashioned and built as a subject by ourselves, but always and originally through an interplay
between the self and the other. When this foundation of the liminal in-between is radically
altered through death, we must face the fundamental nature of the relationship between the I and
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the other, and therein we begin to understand the nature of our ground and the meaning of the
other’s death.
Without the physical presence of the other, this in-between dramatically shifts but
perseveres. Before the other’s death, even while I felt connected to that person, I could continue
to perceive my existence in autonomy and their existence as separate. But after death, this
changes. Without the other’s physical body as a point of connection, one half of this in-between
that has crafted my very existence is no longer present. But because the in-between belonged to
each of us and each in our own separate way, the other persists. The change is marked. But it is
not total. The in-between myself and the other continues in a new way. Suddenly, I recognize
just how much the in-between has created. It has molded my body, my earth, my memories. In
short, the in-between has created my subjectivity. In fact, I perhaps cannot speak of a subject
only but also of an intersubjectivity.
The subject, as described in the previous chapter, was analyzed from the first-person
singular perspective: how one lives one’s own subjectivity. In this second chapter, I extend the
discussion of subjectivity by arguing that intersubjectivity is significantly constitutive for
subjectivity by considering the notions of natality as it creates earth and world, the caress as it
creates the body, and language as it creates memory. I will begin with how we experience the
other as that person or those people for whom we plan for the future and experience the
possibility of natality. We will then move to the notion of the caress of the other and how it
opens us up to our body in the present moment. Finally, language will be explored as a two-way
vehicle that has always already structured our experiences and which both shepherds us back to
our past memories and also ferries us away from these memories. In this way, we will set out the
notion of subjectivity as a fantasy of autonomy founded on the in-between of intersubjectivity.
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We will see how memory relies upon language, the body relies upon the caress, and the
earth/world relies upon the natality between the I and the other. This situation of a temporally
bound intersubjectivity will allow us in our final chapter to arrive at the main investigation of
this work: the continuation upon the earth of the other after death.
The Rise of the In-Between of Intersubjectivity and Natality as Future
In the first chapter, we established the human being as future-oriented through the drive
towards the earth, understood in terms of both the physical earth itself and the metaphysical
world that opens from the subject’s projection upon the earth. We also noted Heidegger’s future
orientation based upon the person’s ownmost possibility of not being or the futural beingtoward-death. In this second chapter, I argue that future orientation is conditioned by the
possibility of natality between the self and the other. In order to explain this in-between, I will set
out the nature of my relationship to the other in Levinas and Irigaray and link this to an
Arendtian notion of natality. I will then unpack how the other is a fundamental aspect in the
establishment of the world. Finally, I will explain the nature of our relation to the other and the
future, not through a fear of one’s own death (as in Heidegger), nor through a fear of the other’s
death (as in Levinas), but as a possibility of natality between the I and the other.
In his ethical essay Totality and Infinity, Levinas deems the face to face encounter an
“ultimate situation,”80 in which the other presents him or herself across an infinite transcendence
where I must question myself and give an account of myself in the face of the other. Essentially,
the face of the other demands attention, it is a recognition that “[m]y freedom does not have the
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last word. I am not alone.”81 Counter to Sartre’s radical absolute freedom, wherein each person is
utterly free to make whichever choice they want, and even the glass ceiling of Beauvoir’s
situated freedom, wherein one recognizes the limitations set upon the freedom of one body
versus another (for example, the limits set upon a black body as opposed to a white body in
contemporary North American civilian/ law enforcement relations), Levinas claims that my own
freedom is always secondary to the freedom of the other and I recognize this through the face to
face encounter. However, Levinas does not extend the category of absolute Other to all
relationships. In opposition, he also maintains a domesticated other, who is the feminine partner
to the I and does not offer a radical difference. The home and the family is a place of escape and
comfort, not of demand and radical alterity.
Luce Irigaray offers a critique of Levinas’ theory82 that allows for a continuation of the
terrifying demand of the radical other, but also permits for an alterity and transcendence through
what Levinas sees as the domesticated other. This means that for Irigaray, the other I know and
love can also offer transcendence and mystery through a mutual love and equal level of respect. I
know the other well enough to recognize just how unknowable she truly is and love her enough
to permit her the secrets and mystery that allow her to be human. When we do not allow this to
those we love, we level that loved one down to our own perception. We discredit his alterity,
autonomy, and his ability to surprise us. In the most extreme way, we see this in Othello. Blinded
by the jealousy planted in him by Iago, Othello literally snuffs out the life of his beloved
Desdemona because he cannot know for certain if she is faithful to their marriage. He denies her
a personal interiority, therein denying her the human condition. When he realizes that this denial
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cannot bring him what he seeks, that he can never know for certain the longings of her heart and
the actions of her past, he takes her life.83 Similarly, in The Winter’s Tale, Hermione is turned
into a statue by her husband’s misguided jealousy. It is only upon the return of her daughter, and
more importantly, the return of her human dignity, that she returns to life as her friend Paulina
entreats, “‘Tis time; descend; be stone no more; approach;/ Strike all that look upon with marvel.
Come,/ I’ll fill your grave up: stir, nay, come away,/ Bequeath to death your numbness, for from
him/ Dear life redeems you.”84 In a form of death that sustains her body, Hermione is reduced to
a statue, to that which is less than human but holds the human form. This denial of alterity and
interiority to the domesticated other is a common misstep of Western patriarchal thought, which
Irigaray skillfully avoids by adapting the relationship to the domesticated other as driven not by a
demand, as is the case in Levinas’ radical alterity, but by a consensual love that allows for the
other to meet the I in-between and create a shared threshold. Rather than the asymmetry of
Levinas’ alterity in which the subject must give continually to the radical other on the one hand,
or receive the domesticated other in her totality on the other hand, Irigaray’s other finds an inbetween.85 We can consider this as a move similar to Jean-Luc Marion’s erotic reduction, in
which I ask “Does anyone out there love me?” and can only find an answer in the affirmative by
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making the decision to love first. Only by loving the other first can I discover that they also love
me and experience a relief from the superfluous vanity of my own existence by way of a love
that allows the I to be and also renders it incredibly different from before it loved.86 The love of
the other is a leap, in which both the I and the other are revealed. It is not an escapism nor a
mere comfort but requires a boldness and an immense personal risk.
Irigaray’s adaptation or addition to Levinas’ alterity allows for us to avoid the
demanding stifling of alterity in those we know and instead to open up to the possibility of
transcendence through love. In this way, we can begin to conceive of our relationship to the other
as a future-oriented drive that is more than a being towards the death-of-the-other, more than a
demand or guilt towards the other; rather, it is a natality.87 The future-oriented drive of alterity
springs from a possibility to create something between myself and the other. Between the I and
the other, Levinas posits a demand, which Irigaray modifies into love. The demand creates us as
individuals and forces us to be who we are in the eyes of the other. Love, on the other hand, is a
consensual act. It is an in-between through which both I and other contribute. It is neither she nor
I, but the mixture of both. It is a phenomenology of us. The experience of the other in Irigaray is
a communal birth of the us: “They are reborn, each for the other, in the assumption and
absolution of a definitive conception. Each one welcomes the birth of the other… they love each
other as the bodies they are. Not irremediably diminished by having been born in different times
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and places nor by having lived prior to their mutual union and generation.”88 From this
consensual interplay springs the possibility of creation. Thus, from love, we find the possibility
of natality.
Hannah Arendt asserts that the highest achievement of humans happens as a form of birth
or creation between people. Arendt claims that: “With word and deed we insert ourselves into the
human world, and this insertion is like a second birth, in which we confirm and take upon
ourselves the naked fact of our original physical appearance.”89 Similar to Irigaray’s notion that
lovers experience a second birth into radically new people, Arendt sees our speech and action as
acts of birth and insertion into the community of humanity. And while each person begins each
action alone, it can only be brought to completion by a group and it can only occur between
people, not alone:
Action and speech go on between men, as they are directed toward them, and they
retain their agent revealing capacity even if their content is exclusively
“objective,” concerned with the matters of the world of things in which men
move, which physically lies between them and out of which arises their specific,
objective, worldly interests. These interests constitute, in the world’s most literal
significance, something which inter-est, which lies between people and therefore
can relate and bind them together.90
Every interest that humans have, even when it seems to be separate, is actually a connection to
the community. Our interests are shared among others and form a web of possible manifestations
of natality or creation between ourselves and others.
Arendt claims that as humans our words and deeds create a “web of human
relationships”91 that is more intangible, but no less real, than the “world of things we visibly have
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in common.”92 Thus, for Arendt, we are only capable of action, speech, and the second birth of
inserting ourselves into the realm of human affairs through a community, through sharing an inbetween with others.93 In our speech, we posit or birth who we are and in our action, we create a
new beginning. This marks the shift between the cyclical earth, which we enter upon our first
physical birth and the world of politics and community, which we enter upon our second birth.
The movement from earth to world marks the highest potential of the vita activa and the essence
of the human condition: to live among others upon the earth and step beyond the cycle of nature
in order to birth something new (an idea or a way of being) in the in-between collaboration with
other humans. Arendt notes that this web of human relations complicates our actions and makes
fulfilling an action almost impossible. The process of creation between the self and the other will
always move beyond our own conceptions, because it is precisely by opening up and sharing
with this alterity that radical new possibilities are born. Thus, the other as an unknowable and
unpredictable alterity that drives us towards natality contains the possibility of both a Levinasian
terror and Irigaray’s love. We cannot ever know for certain that we will receive love in return,
and even if we do, we cannot know for certain that this love will yield the possibilities that we
hope. As Richard Kearney suggests, the other may not be the transcendent alterity described by
Levinas, but rather, may be a psychopathic murderer.94 This not knowing is a necessary part of
the fear and the risk of natality as an in-between.
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With the notion of alterity in Levinas and Irigaray set out and related to Arendt’s natality,
let us now turn to how the other is pivotal in opening up the world for the subject, followed by an
explication of how this natality amounts to the future for the subject. It is through the other that a
nuanced, multi-faceted world opens up for the I. This world is a complicated experience, which
continually informs us that we can never have the whole truth or have the last word on anything.
Following Kant, Bergson’s notion of experience divides the subjective internal experience in
time and the objective external experience in space without acknowledging the meeting place of
the two in intersubjectvity. This chapter aims to muddy this distinction, but let us first clarify
how Bergson draws this divide. He notes that when I smell a rose it is not the same as when
someone else smells a rose:
To others it will smell differently. -- It is always the same scent, you will say, but
associated with different ideas.-- I am quite willing that you should express
yourself in this way; but do not forget that you have first removed the personal
element from the different impressions which the rose makes on each one of us;
you have retained only the objective aspect, the part of the scent of the rose which
is public property and thereby belongs to space.95
We are made up of a diverse compilation of memories that is unique to the individual self. These
memories are, of course, influenced and colored by the other, but they are then stored by the
individual alone. We cannot access the other’s interiority nor they ours. The communal is the
spatial external earth and the private is the temporal internal world. Thus for Bergson, the other
is involved only in the external.
Paradoxically, I argue that the other is responsible for crafting both our internal and
external experiences. I am in a world that has been created not by myself alone, not by the other,
but rather, between myself and the other. All that has been created, the entirety of human
natality, is a product not of myself but of my relation to the other. In many ways, the world has
95
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no author because each act of creation is a birth between people. Rather than Bergson’s division,
let us consider Arendt’s web of human connectivity, which works in both the private and the
public, the temporal and the spatial. Arendt’s model sets out the paradox of the self wherein the
other crafts, yet cannot access, my inner world; the other shares my external world and yet
cannot experience that world in the same tones and intensities of my own experience. The inbetween that we dare to take part in is made public for Arendt, because it creates “somebodies”
who act and speak in a community. The acts and speech, the reification of these creative
encounters between people, is made public in her philosophy and creates the ability for us to
interact as a productive community. She allows for an inner world, but also encourages an outer
world, both of which are created by the in-between. The rose’s smell is specific to my own
memories, but these memories have been crafted by and with the other.
The impenetrable nature of alterity is a part of what drives us toward the other despite our
fear and our unwillingness to experience discomfort. Levinas explains how the other cannot be
grasped:
The absolutely other is the Other… Neither possession nor the unity of number
nor the unity of concepts link me to the Stranger [l’Etranger], the Stranger who
disturbs the being at home with oneself [le chez moi]. But stranger also means the
free one. Over him I have no power. He escapes my grasp by an essential
dimension, even if I have him at my disposal. He is not wholly in my site.96
There is a sense of freedom in the other because she or he exists beyond the I’s totalizing
understanding of the world. The other is always impenetrable. In an Arendtian
framework, this impenetrability manifests in our actions. The ability to create that which
is radically new is a mysterious force in the human condition: “The fact that man is
capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to

96

Levinas, Totality, 39.

Lawson 56

perform what is infinitely improbable. And this again is possible only because each man
is unique, so that with each birth something uniquely new comes into the world.”97 Each
individual person is capable of creating something utterly new and in this way, each
person harbors an unknowable force. We cannot know how the other will shatter, form,
or change our world, but we do know that every aspect of that world has been shaped
between our self and the other. We are inexplicably drawn to the raw potential for action
and natality that the other contains. While Levinas and Arendt both offer a world that is,
at least in part, formed with the other, Bergson does not and this divergence of my project
from Bergson should be noted.
Bergson is cautious in approaching anything like a relation to the other and
alterity because he sees the other as capable of shifting the I from an authentic self to a
“second self.”98 The second self does what one is supposed to do, listens to the populist
ideals, and ignores Polonious’ famous advice, “this above all else, to thine own self be
true and it shall follow as the day the night, thou canst not be false to any man.”99 In
recognizing the truth of the other, I lose my own truth. For Bergson, the other is not the
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creator of the world but rather causes the self to slip into an inauthentic relationship with
the world:
When our most trustworthy friends agree in advising us to take some important
step, the sentiments which they utter with so much insistence lodge on the surface
of our ego and there get solidified in the same way as the ideas of which we spoke
just now. Little by little they will form a thick crust which will cover up our own
sentiments; we shall believe that we are acting freely, and it is only by looking
back to the past, later on, that we shall see how much we were mistaken. 100
The sentiments of the other cloud over our own sentiments in Bergson’s reading.
Heidegger speaks of this phenomenon in Being and Time and argues that Dasein lives
inauthentically and becomes Das Man (or the they-self, the mass society) when it is
subsumed by the inauthentic idle chatter of others. It is only in a silence or a dialogue
between self and Being that authenticity can be achieved. Thus, in this case, both
Heidegger and Bergson see the self as autonomous, whereas Arendt and Levinas see the
self as reliant upon the other. While I will not disagree with the possibility of being
subsumed by the second self in some of our subsequent worldly encounters with the
other, the originary creation of the authentic self springs from a primary and formative
relation between my self and the other. In the creative in-between the I and the other,
each individual facet of the I is forged and the world as we know it is created. This
relation to the other that brings out the second self is an event that happens in a world
already created between the I and the other.
In Levinas, the other has always already created this world for us in this more
primordial way: “The Other, the signifier, manifests himself in speaking of the world and
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not of himself; he manifests himself by proposing the world, by thematizing it.”101 One
individual on their own can create a world of make-believe, but upon entering into a
community, there must be a common understanding that will constitute what the
community identifies as the world. “The presence of the Other dispels the anarchic
sorcery of the facts: the world becomes an object.”102 The other allows the world to reify
into a fixed and shared experience. The I and the other agree upon the facts of the world
or face dire consequences. On an individual level, those who cannot agree on the facts of
the world may be institutionalized, on a national level, violence breaks out between
groups that cannot agree on the facts and parameters of the world, and on an international
level, a disagreement of this type can lead to war.
The I does not create the world on its own, but rather, it is created between people
in a discourse. The objectivity of the world is “posited in a discourse, in a conversation
which proposes the world. The proposition held between two points which do not
constitute a system, a cosmos, a totality.”103 For Levinas, the world comes to us not from
ourselves but from the other: “To receive the given is already to receive it as taught – as
an expression of the other…”104 Everything that is given to the I is the product of an inbetween the I and the other. The other stands before us as a beacon of natality. They
beckon us to open, to love, to fear, but always to create.
Having utilized Bergson, Levinas, and Irigaray to set out this ground work of our
relationship between self and other as a well-spring of natality, let us finally link the
natality between the I and alterity to the future oriented aspect of our subjectivity. In the
101

Levinas, Totality, 96.
Ibid., 99.
103
Ibid., 96.
104
Ibid., 92.
102

Lawson 59

first chapter, we set out how the connection to the surrounding earth drives the subject
toward the future. Recall that earth is the ontic physical material and world is that which
humans phenomenologically make of the earth.
This future orientation toward the world is founded in-between the I and the
other: that which drives every project forward is our relation to the other and potential for
a natality between the I and the other. The human potential for natality arises from the inbetween. Without the other, there is no freeing the self from the totalizing world of the I:
“it is not I who resists the system as Kierkegaard thought; it is the other.”105 Only through
the influence of the other can I see the possibility to shatter the world and create
something wholly new. Thus, we have the originary relation between the I and the other,
wherein natality creates the world and we have the secondary relation to the other that
allows our reified expectation to be smashed as something radically new is created.
Contra Heidegger, Levinas argues that ontology, or the study of being, is not
originary, but rather ethics, or our relation to others, comes before all else. We are not
isolated lone subjects, thrown into being on our own, but rather, we are called into being
by the other. It is not until the other calls to us that we see ourselves as separate. It is the
possibility of the other’s death towards which I strive, or rather, it is for the other that I
live. The other literally constitutes me as a subject, calls me into being. The other molds
me and demands me to be a continually giving host to her needs and in this state of
continually giving I also become hostage to her every desire. Thus Levinas considers our
futural orientation not towards my own death, but towards the death of the other[s]. I am
constantly preparing for the possibility of the other’s death. I go about my day to day life
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serenely dreaming that the other will always be there to laugh with, to tell ideas, to argue
with and live with, when suddenly I am paralyzed with the undeniable possibility that the
other can die. I recognize that he or she will one day die. Selfishly, I can only wish that it
shall be me who dies first and not the other. While we cannot say for certain the
experience of the dead after the body perishes, we know the shattered pain of the living
who mourn those lost. Even those beyond our years, our parents or grandparents, whose
deaths are timely and in the natural progression of Shakespeare’s seven stages of life,106
leave us broken. The death of the other is the concern that drives my life.
This is not a suggestion that Levinas’ humans are purely altruistic while
Heidegger’s subject is purely self-absorbed.107 Rather than pure altruism, this Levinasian
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futural projection that looks not to my own death, but to the death of the other is also selfserving. The other is the necessary alterity with which I create the world. The other’s
input meets my own and constitutes my subjectivity. The other is the only possibility I
have of fashioning myself. Arendt tells us that “nobody is the author or producer of his
own life story.”108 With the death of the other, a piece of that story is forever lost. With
the other’s death, my own narrative, my own subjectivity is radically and irreconcilably
altered. I mourn for the other in his or her self but so too do I mourn for myself in the
other. Thus, our subject is drawn into the future, towards the possibility of the death of
the other, or in a positive sense, toward the life of the other.
The I and the other move toward the future through a joint natality, a drive to
create that is more than simply our inspiration for the future, but is our future. And this
future is us. In our creation and natality that springs from between the I and the other, we
become somebodies, a who in the Arendtian sense. This process of becoming a somebody
is not an act that takes place in the present for the I and the other alone, but rather,
reaches beyond to something radically new, creating a world for the community, for the
larger web of humanity and the generations to come. If we begin from a societal focus on
autonomy, striving for this type of glory can seem self serving, but when we consider a
communal way of being, it is only through such a creative striving that we are given new
possibilities for the what and the who of a human. The natality between the self and the
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other also encompasses the temporal moments of past and present, but these two modes
are secondary to the future. While creation is always looking forward toward that which
is creating, it is also leaning upon the bodily actions between myself and the other with
whom I am creating in the present moment. Furthermore, future-oriented natality also
leans upon the memories of the past, communicated by language between the I and the
other, upon which we can ground our shared world and our creative plans for the future.
Thus, future orientation upon the earth towards the world and its projects is founded upon
the possibility of natality between the I and the other. My drive towards the future is
always a drive of natality with the other.
The Caress: Present
In the previous chapter, we argued that the individual human body brings us into
the present moment. It holds back the curtains of the past and the future and through the
body, we can enter into this moment, this breath, this now, this sensation. We can see this
in yoga and meditation exercises where the practitioner comes into the present through
focusing on the body’s steady breathing. But what gives us our body? How does the
human receive the body? In a material primordial way, we receive the body from our
mother, who has created it with our father. There are already necessarily at least two
others in the process of creating our physical form. Once the other has given us our body
in an ontic, physical way, they re-give it to us over and over through what Levinas calls
the caress. In the present section, we will set out the definition of the caress for Levinas,
and how Irigaray adapts this notion in order to maintain alterity. I will argue that the
caress gives us our own body, as flesh, in a recognition that it is not solely our own
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autonomous possession, but rather a shared experience between myself and the other.
Finally, I will conclude by situating the caress as the opening of the present moment.
Vastly different from merely touching, in Levinas, the caress opens up our body
in the present moment. Consider incidentally touching elbows or arms with someone on a
city bus. We feel that touch as we feel the bus seat beneath. It is undeniably present, but it
is almost inanimate. Compare this to holding a loved one’s hand before they go into
surgery, or kissing the face of your newborn child.109 As humans, we are able to caress, to
open ourselves up to that which we caress, be it animal, plant, or another human. But it is
only the other human that can truly reciprocate. In this pairing, “the I springs forth
without returning, finds itself the self of an other.”110 Levinas refers to the corporeal
caress as the product of the erotic relationship.111 Let us consider this notion of the erotic
as all forms of loving touch and not simply romantic love. In the caress, “the body quits
the status of an existent”112 and infinity is opened up to the Levinasian subject.113
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While Levinas offers a jumping off point, the notion of the subject pursued in this
paper is more about a love between the self and the other, as suggested by Irigaray in her
ethics, than about the demand that Levinas posits in his ethics. In her critical analysis of
Levinas, Irigaray extends the Levinasian view of the face: “Lovers’ faces live not only in
the face but in the whole body.”114 The Levinasian notion of the face is the site of alterity,
transcendence, and self-reflection through the eyes of the other. By shifting this site from
the face to the entire body, Irigaray opens up the possibility of transcendence through the
hands, the fingers, the lips. In defense of Irigaray’s inclusion of the body as a site of
ethical imperative, let me recall a personal experience from years ago: Sitting down at a
subway stop before dawn early in the winter morning, I am arrested by the calloused,
work worn hands of the man on the bench beside me. The care he has taken to clean
under each finger nail, the smell of the pungent lemon soap still hangs in the air. I never
saw his face, but his hands acted as Levinas’ face. I could see how hard he worked, how
he had shaved and cleaned in the black cold of a New York winter’s morning. I still think
about him years later. I still feel that I somehow know him, that there is something
indescribable that I owe to him. Through his hands I experienced Levinas’ concept of the
face. Levinas already sets us up for this possibility of an alterity beyond the face through
his notion of the caress between lovers:
The caress consists in seizing upon nothing, in soliciting what ceaselessly escapes
its form toward a future never future enough, in soliciting what slips away as
though it were not yet. It searches, it forages. It is not an intentionality of its
closure but of its search: a movement unto the invisible. In a certain sense it
expresses love, but suffers from an inability to tell it.115
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From this passage, we can see Irigaray’s jump from the face to the entire body when it concerns
lovers. It is only through the body that the mind or spirit can be accessed. In the body we catch a
glimpse of the radical alterity of other human beings. In our body, we interact with the bodies of
others. The body is our vehicle to the possibility of intersubjectivity. Through the face, the body,
the caress we can reach others, we can interact with others in a deeply profound and transcendent
way.
With Levinas and Irigaray’s notions of the caress set out, let us turn to how Levinas
posits the caress as an escapism that loses alterity, while Irigaray maintains alterity in the caress.
For Levinas, the caress leads the subject to vacate his or her own body, and in so doing to fly
from the world. There is an unworldly power to the caress that is incredibly human and interior
but also a danger to the political realm and the community of human beings. It is with this in
mind that Levinas distinguishes the caress as a mere escapism or a navel gazing transcendence
and not the true alterity of the absolute other’s ethical imperative. He explains and overcomes
this problematic aspect of the caress through a traditional patriarchal family structure: The
masculine I escapes from day to day life into the transcendence of the feminine alterity. The
domain of the feminine is the home, the space of dwelling. The feminine other constructs and
upholds this dwelling, which in turn is ruled by the masculine I. From the space of dwelling, the
feminine is folded back into the male I in a merger that pulls Levinas’ relation of the male to the
female into a variation of the Hegelian synthesis. There is no real difference here because it is an
alterity that can be subsumed and controlled. Thus, the realm of the home as feminine domain is
posited by Levinas as one of mere escapism from the external world and not true alterity.116 In
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this way, Levinas overcomes the problem of the caress, namely its anti-political and thus
potentially anti-ethical nature. But something is lost in not allowing the caress to take part in the
ethical landscape.117
In a response to Levinas, Irigaray claims that rather than the caress drawing us out of the
world, it has the potential to create a threshold between the I and the other.118 In this way, the
lovers create a threshold of flesh, in which they share a space of infinity grounded in the totality
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of their bodies. Here, one can dwell with the other in a shared space of difference: “A qualitative
threshold makes it possible for love to endure. For the lovers to be faithful? When they do not
obey, the threshold wears out. The house of flesh which lets them remember each other, call to
each other- even at a distance- is destroyed.”119 The love born of the erotic encounter creates a
sacred dwelling shared by the lovers. Unreified but accessible within the totality, this dwelling is
a moveable feast nourished by faith in one another.
Rather than a counterpoint or a danger to ethics, the caress becomes the harbinger
of a lasting ethics and alterity in Irigaray's reading. The caress brings about the founding
relationship to alterity from which all others are built. In the originary caress of the
parent, or any subsequent caress, we connect profoundly to the other as Other. They are
not the I and yet they open up the body of the I. The other’s caress unites me to the other,
“dissolving the in-between” and simultaneously makes me recognize the limits of such a
merger. Like Aristophanes in The Symposium, I long to find the other’s body and mend it
to my own, becoming whole. But the other’s body is, as Helena finds in A Midsummer
Night’s Dream, “mine own and not mine own.”120 The other’s body defies my grasp in
this paradox of being both alienated and at home. Thus, the caress opens the possibilities
but also shows us the limits of a connection to the Other.
In this reading, there remains a sense of alterity in the caress and the undoing of the self.
Irigaray explains the role of the caress between lovers:
Without paralysis or violence, the lovers would beckon to each other, at first from far
away. A salutation that means the crossing of a threshold. Pointing out the space of a love
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that has not yet been made profane. The entrance into the dwelling or the temple, where
each would invite the other, and themselves, to come in, also into the divine.121
Irigaray calls upon the human creation of a dwelling or a temple and skillfully places this
metaphor into the erotic relation between lovers. For Irigaray, the temple of transcendence is a
Levinasian connection to another human being. But unlike Levinas, Irigaray’s other need not
force a shameful and shocking experience upon the I in order to glimpse a trace of the divine.
Levinas requires this abject fear and repulsion towards the Other in order to truly have the
experience of the trace of God. The Other must be so radically beyond my world that I realize
the divine unfathomability surrounding my encounter with the Other. But Irigaray suggests that
the experience of the Other need not always be of this ilk. The caress can be more than an
escapism, it can be the possibility of ethics through a love that begins in the caress. “This
gesture, which is always and still preliminary to and in all nuptials, which weds without
cosum(mat)ing, which perfects while abiding by the outlines of the other, this gesture may be
called: the touch of the caress.”122 This ethical alterity is founded on the caress of an other and
experienced as an awakening of the body in its presence and vast possibilities.
Having set out the notion of caress in both Levinas and Irigaray and investigated how
these two thinkers respectively forbid and allow alterity in the caress, let us turn to the
Levinasian notion that the body quits its status as existent under the caress of the Other. This is
an aspect of the caress that will allow us to follow Irigaray by ultimately positing the caress as
the in-between myself and the other. In turn, this will open up the caress to a becoming in the
present moment that exits in the realm of in-between. Contra Levinas, this paper argues that the
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body is given in the caress and not taken away. Irigaray counter’s the disappearance of the body
in the Levinasian caress:
as he caresses me, he bids me neither to disappear nor to forget but rather to
remember the place where, for me, the most intimate life is held in reserve.
Searching for what has not yet come into being for himself, he invites me to
become what I have not yet become. To realize a birth that is still in the future.
Plunging me back into the maternal womb and beyond that conception,
awakening me to another birth—as a loving woman.123
In this way, we understand the caress as an opening up of pure potentiality between the I and the
other. It is a rebirth. It is not that the body disappears per say, but rather that it becomes open to
becoming. No longer merely a set, static entity, the body realizes its potential and raw possibility
in the caress. Thus, the caress draws our physical form into recognition of its own connection to
the surrounding bodies of the earth. Deleuze explains this phenomenon via Spinoza: “I only ever
know the mixtures of bodies and I only know myself by way of the action of other bodies on me
and by way of mixtures.”124 The caress of the other gives us our body alongside the recognition
that our body has never been what we had thought. It radically alters our experience of the body
as it becomes simultaneously my own and the other’s and no one’s.
In short, the experience of the caress, is la petite mort, a small taste of what it is for the other
to die. It is a mind boggling recognition that the body is not its own ground. Passionate lovers
can literally lose themselves (their I as ground) in the caress, which leads to a madness or a
forceful desire to regain their own ground by any means necessary, such as we see in the love of
Verlaine and Rimbaud. Verlaine can only take back his own ground by freeing himself of
Rimbaud. In this case, by literally shooting him. But this loss of ground, while frightening, need
not lead to violence or a sense of groundless unworldliness. Rather, it can educate us regarding
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the reality of our relationship between the self and the other as foundation of the self. As we
come to terms with our reliance on the other and the world creation that the other performs with
us, we gain a deeper recognition of our need for community, politics, and ethics. We can use this
world changing revelation to recognize our subjectivity as less autonomous than we initially
assumed and to launch ourselves into a new notion of the subject. The caress brings about a
shocking shift of ground, but it need not be only destructive. It can also be a vital and creative
leap into a new conception of our very being. The caress does in a sense draw us out of our body,
but only to show us that we have been incorrect to assume that our body is our own. Instead, we
find our body as given to us by the caress in-between the I and the other.
The caress is the in-between that is our experience not merely of the body or the
displacement of the body as sole ground. Rather, the caress is the present moment. It is through
the caress that the body opens up in the now. The caress of the other implores, and the I stands
before the choice to open up into the present or to deny the love and remain aloof. The caress
opens the body, asks the subject to feel the vital flow in-between itself and the other. It opens up
what Irigaray terms a threshold of flesh. This qualitative threshold, this house of flesh, is a
recognition of the full potential of the physical body at the very limits of its physical frame. It is
the space in which I am fully embodied and through this embodiment share the force of pure
presence: “The one for the other, messengers of a future that is still to be built and contemplated.
The one for the other, already known and still unknown. The one for the other, mediators of a
secret, a force, and an order that also touches on the divine.”125 The world slows down, the
senses become hyper perceptive, the breath flows in and out, the caress unfolds the present as
neither my own nor the other’s but in an exchange that does not merely give presence but is
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presence. Additionally, the caress contains a whisper of future-oriented natality, of shear
possibility in its utter presence: it generates a pathway to the future. In the caress of the other, my
body opens up to the very limits of its possibility and recognizes the potential to create: to make
that which is radically new. The caress also contains my past-oriented memories and the
language (both verbal and sensual) that I have shared with others. It gathers these memories and
words around the present moment as a foundation and a lens of perception in the present caress.
Gathering the forces of the past and the future, the caress is an opening in the present. It gives us
our own body in a new way. It makes possible. It cracks open the present and stands firmly in the
flesh before the world as an intersubjective dynamic between myself and the other.
Language: The Past
“I was gathering images my whole life, storing them away, and forgetting them. Somehow I had
to send myself back, with words as catalysts, to open the memories out and see what they had to
offer.”
-

Ray Bradbury, Dandelion Wine

Memory is the path to the past and language forges this path. Our memories are
incredibly personal and create a rich and layered subject. Through the other, language is shared,
taught, explored and pushed to its limits. In a shared language, the other offers me the tools to
form memories, to clarify and sharpen them with more and more exact words. Bergson tells us
that “a word has an individuality for us only from the moment that we have been taught to
abstract it.”126 Only by interacting with an other, learning not just the word itself, but how to
move and create with the word, can I begin to form my own words and craft my own memories.
Furthermore, the words and moments shared between myself and the other color my memories
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with a distinct tone specific to that particular person. In this section on our relationship to the
past, I will argue that language acts as an originary creative force but paradoxically, it also drives
us away from the originary experience of the other by demanding a reified definition of all
objects and people. Language necessarily implies a what and not the ontological difference of a
who. It necessarily rejects the un-nameable because its very essence is to name. Thus language
creates and leaves no traces of its origin. I will set out how language draws us away from our
originary experience of our lives in Bergson and, paradoxically, how it also offers us a path back
to that experience (in Heidegger), and how, if we follow Levinas, language in its paradoxical
complexities, acts as an interconnection, or an in-between the I and the other. Finally, I will
unpack how language is oriented to the past and memory.
Let us begin with Bergson, whose philosophy is exemplary in explaining how language
can be a force that draws us away from the experience of the other and shared memories.
Bergson’s stance on language seems paradoxical to what this thesis will eventually argue: that
language creates an in-between the I and the other, which drives our orientation to the past. But
Bergson offers us an inroad to the paradox of language: it is both that which drives us away from
the other and that which connects us to the other. Unlike the so-called linguistic turn of
philosophers shortly after his time, Bergson is extremely critical of language.127 A student of
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Bergson, T.S. Eliot sets out the debilitated inability of language to articulate the human condition
in his cynical modern love poem, “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock”. Prufrock observes, “it
is impossible to say just what I mean.”128 Prufrock is stunted in his ability to connect to others
through language, and he feels the violence inherent in the language of others:
And I have known the eyes already, known them all—
The eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase,
And when I am formulated, sprawling on a pin,
When I am pinned and wriggling on the wall,
Then how should I begin
To spit out all the butt-ends of my days and ways?129
Eliot notes that this poem is a direct product of reading Bergson’s work.130 Indeed, for Bergson,
“every language, whether elaborated or crude, leaves many more things to be understood than it
is able to express.”131 Bergson offers us a view of language that alienates and draws us away
from both internal and external connections to our own self and to the other. Language reifies
and in so doing, kills the liminal, dynamic experience that it expresses.132
In unpacking Bergson’s use of language, it can be helpful to consider Arendt’s distinction
between earth and world. For Arendt, world is a celebrated shift from humans as laboring
servants bound to the whims of the earth into homo faber who creates the world and masters the
earth. This is a shift from being cogs in a cyclical natural system to standing out as individual
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human beings. But for Bergson, this shift, which is the shift into language, entails being violently
pulled out of the durée, or the sense of openness in pure duration. Bergson notes the severe
boundaries that language enforces, and while these boundaries can be helpful in some cases, they
can be extremely detrimental in others: “In short, the word with well-defined outlines, the rough
and ready word, which stores up the stable, common, and consequently impersonal element on
the impressions of mankind, overwhelms or at least covers over the delicate and fugitive
impressions of our individual consciousness.”133 It is our most intensely experienced moments
that the word defies. Be they private moments, such as pausing under a cherry blossom tree in
the springtime to drink in the tree or public moments, such as protesting for and speaking about a
cause in which you believe, there are no words for these intensities and to slap a word upon them
is to deny the unique experience and make it a reified commercialized common event.
Simply put, “language is not meant to convey all the delicate shades of inner states.”134
The objectifying act of language separates and makes common all things until they move from
the durée into separate reified boxes: “A moment ago each of them was borrowing an
indefinable colour from its surroundings: now we have it colourless, and ready to accept a
name.”135 For Bergson, the true self is made of a series of shimmering and overlapping
intensities and memories, dynamically circling and bleeding into one another. This notion of the
self is not cohesive with language, but rather it is destroyed, muffled, or at the very least
repressed by words.
[A]s we dig below the surface and get down to the real self, do its states of
consciousness cease to stand in juxtaposition and begin to permeate and melt into
one another, and each to be tinged with the colouring of all the others. Thus each
of us has his own way of loving and hating; and this love or this hatred reflects his
133
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whole personality. Language, however, denotes these states by the same words in
every case: so that it has been able to fix only the objective and impersonal aspect
of love, hate, and the thousand emotions which stir the soul.136
The delicate nature of our self is annihilated by language and when we attempt to articulate our
inner lives we are struck dumb. As Prufrock observes in the face of the utter impossibility of
language, “I should have been a pair of ragged claws, scuttling across the floors of silent
seas.”137
This picture of language painted by Bergson is admittedly quite grim and thus far,
language does not seem to be an adequate vehicle through which to access memory or our link to
the past. But let us note that Bergson’s (as well as Proust and Eliot’s) method of expressing these
inadequacies of language is language itself.138 This points to the subtext of language: it also has
the ability to lead us back to that which is closer to me than I am to myself.139 Language assists
in the flight from community into self and it also sets out the way back again. Or, as Harrison
notes, “[e]very reader or listener who reactivates the semantic content of the literary work
performs an act of prosopoeia, that is, a reverbalization of the text through a transfer of his or her
voice to its otherwise dead letter.”140 Even though there is necessarily always something dead in
the linguistic (particularly literature), it also always carries the possibility to come alive again
through a diligent reader. We can see that for Proust and Eliot, this happened through reading the
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words and works of Bergson. And when we ourselves read these three thinkers, the dead letter
may lift off of the page for us as well.
Bergson reflects on the role of the novelist as an anti-linguistic movement: “We estimate
the power of a novelist by the power with which he lifts out of the common domain, to which
language has brought them down, feelings and ideas to which he strives to restore, by adding
detail to detail, their original and living individuality.”141 Bergson’s view of language as masking
over the self is similar to Heidegger’s notion of idle chatter in Being and Time, where the subject
(or Dasein) is made to act and experience life as a member of a homogenous mass culture and
not as a unique individual.142 Heidegger counters this notion of idle chatter with the notion of
openness to Being. In this openness, the dialogue between subject and Being involves a silence
that is listening, hearkening, and finally perhaps speaking.143 These spoken words are poetic and
precise, they communicate something deeper and closer to the Bergsonian self. These words are
capable of creation between the subject and Being.
In his later text, “Letter on Humanism” Heidegger writes: “Language is the house of
Being. In its home man dwells. Those who think and those who create with words are the
guardians of this home. Their guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of Being insofar as
they bring the manifestation to language and maintain it in language through their speech.”144
Here we see Heidegger shift from the Bergsonian notion of language that coincides with his
inauthentic and self-denying idle chatter into the paradoxical subtext of Bergson’s words,
wherein the dead letter comes alive and language opens up an in-between two subjects in which
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memories can be created and accessed. Because this aspect of language in Bergson remains
unspoken and only implied in a meta-reading of his work, we will continue along this path with
Heidegger. In the above quotation, Heidegger is saying that poets (those who think and those
who create with words) create worlds; they care for and maintain the worlds they have created.145
The job of the poet is this silence and openness through which she experiences a higher power or
a source of inspiration beyond herself.146 Epistemologically, this is undoubtedly a religious turn,
but Heidegger does all that he can not to make it about a God or a religion, but rather about the
possibility of a creative ontological moment that happens through the human but is also beyond
the human’s control. He refers to this ontologically creative force beyond man as “Being”. Thus,
for Heidegger, language is “the house of the truth of Being”147 and can only be accessed when
we step into a nameless silence or an unworldliness that allows for a recognition of language as a
home or a world for humanity. 148
Later in the essay Heidegger states, “As the destiny that sends truth, Being remains
concealed. But the world’s destiny is heralded in poetry, without yet becoming manifest as the
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history of Being.”149 The origins of all history, of the narratives woven by the web of human
relationships150 begins in poetry. Before there is a possibility of the world, the poet carves out a
space with a word and they fill the space with objects by naming them; the artists arrive and
diversify the objects; the historians arrive and document the movement of these objects; the
philosophers arrive and speculate upon the nature of these objects.151 But it is the poet capable of
thinking who creates this world, who gives this world objects and who is capable of protecting or
guarding this world. Thus, in a refined and thoughtful way, we can overcome the reified
limitations of language through an open, poetic language.152 By allowing silences and openness,
we can access the self on a deeper, less superficial level. But while this Heideggerian notion of
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language from “Letter on Humanism” offers a more creative and positive interpretation, it still
does not give us the in-between that we seek from language.
While Heidegger and Bergson have very different takes on language (the former as a
positive engagement with Being through poetic words and the latter as a negative and violent
reification of delicate interior intensities), both thinkers tackle the linguistic as a solitary pursuit,
which is strange if we consider that language is a source of communication between people. For
Bergson, language is a covering over of the true or authentic self and for Heidegger, an authentic
linguistic encounter is not the idle chatter that happens amongst humans, but rather a dialogue
between the I and Being. Neither thinker involves the other in any sort of meaningful way in
their linguistic exploration. While I will maintain the linguistic paradox of opening and closing
off ways of being or authentic subjectivity, which exists between these two thinkers, the lack of
alterity in language is where I diverge from Heidegger and Bergson and move into Levinas’
notion of language. Levinas’ assertion that “the call” back to the originary or authentic self is not
a call from Being, as Heidegger asserts, but rather the call of the Other, is our point of departure
in unpacking language as an intersubjective mode of the past:
Language, far from presupposing universality and generality, first makes them
possible. Language presupposes interlocuters, a plurality… language is spoken
when community between the terms of the relationship is wanting, where the
common plane is wanting or is yet to be constituted. It takes place in this
transcendence… Discourse is thus the experience of something absolutely
foreign, a pure “knowledge” or “experience”, a traumatism of astonishment.153

Before it is my own, language is given to me by the other. The other offers language.
They teach and I learn; I become adept and language is shared; it becomes an in-between: the
interesse par excellence. “Speech is thus the origin of all signification—of tools and all human
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works—for through it the referential system from which every signification arises receives the
very principle of its functioning, its key. Language is not one modality of symbolism; every
symbolism refers already to language.”154 Not merely talking, but a language that also includes
silence and listening is a method to open up to radical natality between subjects and to intensely
re-live our memories, experiencing the other anew. The silence and hearkening of true
Heideggerian poetic language is not always a pleasant encounter: indeed, Levinas refers to it as a
traumatism. He sees the silence of language as that which is traumatic and frightening: “Thus
silence is not a simple absence of speech; speech lies in the depths of silence like a laughter
perfidiously held back. It is the inverse of language: the interlocutor has given a sign, but has
declined even interpretation; this is the silence that terrifies.”155 But as I argued in regard to
Levinas’ understanding of the face of the other, this encounter can be wrapped in anxiety and
terror, but so too can it be a birthing place of radical creativity. Indeed, it can be both at the same
time.
Let us return to the paradox of language, which draws us away from or connects us to an
authentic relationship to our own being. If we place the other in the position of Heideggerian
Being, it becomes evident how language can be an interconnection between the I and the other,
therein creating a vast web of memories and intensities woven upon words and poems, looks and
actions between people. But on the other hand, the Bergsonian negative linguistic notion is less
intuitively related to the other. To assist with this, let us consider Marion’s notion of distancing
in our relationship to God. Min describes Marion’s distance as follows:
Distance does not mean spatial distance or spatial absence, nor does it belong to
the world of objects at all. It is not a concept or a signifier. It is the absolute
anterior and exterior horizon for the transcendental relation between God and the
154
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world of objects, a meta-language that describes God’s intimate alterity and
constitutive asymmetry with which God is related to the world.156
For Marion, distance necessitates one to “think the doubly unthinkable according to excess
(supremacy over being in general) and according to lack (withdrawal as insistence, without
being).”157 Marion claims that language is received as a gift but lives in a “linguistic model of the
dispossession of meaning.”158 Namely, the subject does not recognize that language was given
(in the case of Marion, by God, in our case, by the other). It is through the distancing of language
that the subject is born: “Anterior distance demands to be received because it more
fundamentally gives us to receive ourselves in it.”159 It is only by drawing back into alienation
that the I can recognize the saving grace of the other. In this way, language acts as a Brechtian
Verfremdungseffeckt: We are shaken out of our everyday ennui or malaise and in alienation, we
see the other across the abyss of language. Thus, language is an in-between myself and the other
in two ways: first, by connecting us to an other and crafting a web or tapestry of memories, and
second, by alienating us from the other:
We have lingered in the chambers of the sea
By sea-girls wreathed with seaweed red and brown
Till human voices wake us, and we drown.160
Some drown. Some stop fighting and are resigned to a bitter alienated and melancholic day, or
year, or life. But I argue that it is the human condition to carry on. Kushner’s character Prior
Walter explains this irrational but real human tendency:
But still. Still. Bless me anyway. I want more life. I can’t help myself. I do. I’ve lived
through such terrible times, and there are people who live through much, much worse,
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but…You see them living anyway. When they’re more spirit than body, more sores than
skin, when they’re burned and in agony, when flies lay eggs in the corners of the eyes of
their children, they live. Death usually has to take life away. I don’t know if that’s just the
animal. I don’t know if it’s not braver to die. But I recognize the habit. The addiction to
being alive. So we live past hope. If I can find hope anywhere, that’s it, that’s the best I can
do. It’s so much not enough. It’s so inadequate, but…Bless me anyway. I want more
life.161
We do not drown. We find at the depths of despair our saving grace. As Hölderlin says, “yet
where danger lies,/ Grows that which saves.”162 We see the distance between our self and the
other. The other draws closer through distance. Language manifests an in-between the I and the
other through both real connection and irrational distance.163 For Marion, this distance draws us
into the future. It is a series of deferrals towards a God that can never be fully attained. But for
this project, the distance and the connection of language draws us back into the past between the
I and the other. Language forges and later re-awakens in us our memories.
Let us turn, in conclusion, to language’s link to memory and the past. In the first chapter,
we set out the Proustian concept of memory as a rich mixture of the self and the world that draws
us back into the past. We will now return to this memory and argue that it is reliant upon the
other. The smell of summer rain evokes in me a flash, a sensation deep inside. I sift, I search. I
think it will be lost in the same way a sneeze about to explode suddenly subsides. I am silent. I
listen. The colors of the other begin to seep in, to color my very being. But they exist at first in
the un-reified un-objectified existence before linguistic domination. I wait. I breathe in the smell.
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My cousin’s broad mouthed grin as we teeter-totter back and forth on a large piece of driftwood
propped up on a rock. The rain splashing against our skin. We laugh so hard our sides ache. I am
ten. We’ll be in trouble. We mustn’t stay. The waves rush in and out, the sand is rocky and
pricks the feet of whoever falls off. The sun is shining through the rain. I sit in my office
writing, but my entire body and mind (my flesh) moves towards the past. I can smell my cousin’s
skin; I can see the painted rocks of the summer against her cottage door; I can feel the rocky clay
sand beneath my feet. It seems a solitary exercise, but it is not. As Proust’s Marcel continually
turns back for his Mother, I turn back in this case for my cousin. Not as she is today but as she
was as an eleven-year-old child. 164 I am drawn back into something that is not solely my own.
Nor does it belong to my cousin: indeed, she does not have access to this memory as it exists for
me. Rather, this memory is a creation between us. It is her and it is also me. The memory links
me to the other.
Language creates this link in two ways. First, in the connection to the other, language
initially weaves this memory between myself and the other. The other is always already
insinuated in my language and thus there is an other in every one of my memories. Furthermore,
if we note the above example of recalling a childhood afternoon on the beach, the more
particular my language becomes in describing this event, the more specific my memory
becomes. Linguistic specificity allows me to deepen my memories. Additionally, if the other
and I have shared experiences of literature, theatre, or art, the language of these mediums further
Kristeva argues that Marcel’s elated experience of light through the cathedral window
in Venice is a link not between Marcel and God, nor between Marcel and a specific object, but
rather, between Marcel and his mother: “The window is identified with ‘a love which stopped
only where there was no longer any corporeal matter to sustain it, on the surface of her
impassioned gaze’… It says to me the thing that touches me more than anything else in the
world: ‘I remember your mother so well.’” Marcel’s revelation is the ability to feel and
remember his mother. We move back for many reasons: for nostalgia, for vanity, for escape, but
encompassing all of these and most importantly, we go back for the other. See: Kristeva, 113.
164
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colours and effects the memories I share with the other. For example, my friend and I shared a
love of Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby. This is not a surprising or rare love to share, but
nevertheless, this means that each time I am reminded of Gatsby, I am also coloured by
memories of my friend. I arrive at a lavish party and I am “borne back ceaselessly into the
past”165, not simply by a love of a piece of literature (which, in itself, marks a link between
myself and the other as author) but as a love of my friend with whom I endlessly discussed this
book. I am like Gatsby himself who incredulously cries: “Can’t repeat the past?... Why of course
you can!”166 My ways of being are woven by the shared language between self and other and
they act as always already built and building. The other and I have always already created a
language and we can continue to grow and expand that language and its shared narratives. I read
King Lear and I have a new way of casting my memories of my Grandfather’s own pride and
fear in old age. I discuss a production of Lear with my brother and his interpretation begins to
colour my broader conception of humanity. He colours my world and my memories. The richer
my language and my comprehension of myths and narratives, the richer my memories and my
inter-connection with others. The more I share this love of language with others, the more they,
in turn, colour my comprehension of literature, language, and ultimately my memories and
interpretations of the world.
Secondly, language opens us up to the other and to memory when we fail to make a
connection to the other linguistically, when we are alienated by the Bergsonian limitations of
language. When language pins me to the wall, leaves me to drown, shows me the complete
limitation and distance in my relation to the other, this is where I can recognize the other’s
closeness. In this distance and alienation brought on by the poverty of language, I find the other.
165
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From this vantage point, the other is like me: distant, almost impenetrable, in pain, and in grief.
In the heart of my alienation, I find closeness and connection to the other who also comprehends
my condition. But more than this, the other has crafted this condition at my side. We find
ourselves in a condition we have created with one another in our shared language and our shared
culture.
Kristeva argues that Marcel’s moments of transcendence into the past hinge on his link to
the most important person in his life, his mother. For Kristeva, Marcel’s experience of light in
the cathedral square is the very character of time embodied.167 In that moment, he is backward
moving time. He is the past as created between himself and his mother. And for the moment that
I step into the lavish party, I become the past as it was created between myself and my friend. To
be sure, in a sense, I am experiencing both connection and alienation in this moment of past
movement. I step in and I am amazed by the party, I feel connected to my friends who have put
on such an event and pleased to be sharing it with them. I am also struck with sorrow and
alienation as my thoughts of this event mingle with the memories of my friend and how much he
would have loved this night, these stars, that outfit, this cocktail. But be it in a “positive” or
“negative” sense, it is language that connects me to the other as we move back in our language
towards the past.
While language is responsible for the totalizing structure of the world and contains within
it a certain violent demand that crushes and conforms the unreified, it also has a thoughtful
creation and allows humans to encounter one another in and through a construction of

167

Julia Kristeva, Proust and the Sense of Time, trans. Stephen Bann (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1993).

Lawson 86

memories.168 In this way, language gives us the gift of memories, in which we intensely
experience the other in the tapestry of memory and thus move backwards to the past. But in a
lesser way, language also contains the future and the present. Language creates our world and
our possibilities, acting as the base of intersubjective exchange upon which we reach into the
future. Furthermore, language allows for a certain specificity in the present moment’s caress, in
which we can become increasingly specific and eloquent in our construction of new thoughts and
ideas with the other. Language draws us continually back toward the past, but it also holds
within it the modes of future and present.
Language allows us to conceptualize in a way that we can return again and again to our
experiences with the other. The latter is not a mere mental exercise divorced from reality. Rather,
it is the movement into the past with every fiber of our being. Containing elements of future and
present, language and memory become the most precious upon the death of the other. When the
other dies, I can no longer feel his caress, which opens up my body in the present moment and I
cannot create a future-oriented natality upon the earth with the other. But I can continue to be
with the other through the language and narrative of memory.169 And while my memories sweep
backwards into the past, they are replayed in the present and guide my future. Through my
memories, the beloved continues after death. If the person who dies or leaves us is important

In discussing Thoreau, Arsic claims that he gestures towards “a nondualistic ontology
in which the difference between words and things, ideas and bodies, is not considered
insurmountable. Instead, all those different phenomena will be understood to relate to one
another on the same ontological plane, affecting one another in the same being.” This
nondualistic ontology is precisely what I am arguing in this explication of language. See Arsic, 7.
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And indeed, as Arendt shows us in her own narratives on various figures, such as
Rahel Varnhagen, Bertold Brecht, Walter Benjamin and many others, the continuation of the
other via narrative is the very foundation of political agency and the human condition. Curthoys
explains: “evokes the possibility of fragmentary narrations and genealogies which bring into
focus discontinuous and complex forms of sensibility and the crucial, yet often neglected, role of
cultural histories in the formation of political agency.” See: Curthoys, 368.
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enough, it can feel as though we are only ever moving backwards, as Gatsby moves back
towards the Daisy who loved him and Marcel moves back towards his Mother. And while it is
possible to become a Miss Havisham of sorts and remain always in the past, most people find, as
in Ecclesiastes 3, that “there is a season, and a time for every purpose under heaven”170 and will
one day shift from past movement alone into a present or even future oriented temporal direction.
Indeed, there are times when we will continue to be fueled by memories and past but also move
into a creative natality that reaches forward into the future. This will be the focus of the final
portion of this project: an examination of how the other lives on creatively with the I after the
death of the other. I will explore this possibility through a series of art works.
To summarize our exploration of the subject thus far: an “I” constructed of body, earth
and memory has been posited as a product of a relationship with the other. From the caress of the
other, the present moment of the subject opens up via the physical body. From the natality that
links the human being to the other, springs the earth and the world, which thrust the subject
forward toward future possibility. From the thoughtful language between the self and the other,
flows the draw back into the memories of the past. The subject reveals itself as a temporal being,
moving in all three directions of time. The source of this being is not itself nor the other, but the
in-between self and other that creates all possibility of humanity.
This project is a framework for a possible human subjectivity that explains the
phenomenological experience of the death of the other. The subject has been set out this way
because it makes possible the phenomenological experience of the other’s death, but also
because it is a way of being that rings true to (1) my own experience of the world
phenomenologically and (2) the subject as I would like it to be considered both ethically and
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politically. The notion of an autonomous individual subject has propagated political thought and
indeed, much of Western thought in all fields. This notion of the subject has fueled
environmental degradation, crimes against humanity, an uncompromising neoliberal capitalism,
and finally, having estranged ourselves from all people, environment, and experience beyond this
autonomous self, we experience a profound sense of personal alienation. Thus, while this project
springs from a personal and almost metaphysical experience of loss, its implications are
incredibly prescient to greater political and ethical questions of the physical realm. As Levinas
observes, the consequence of the other existing apriori to the I is the originary importance of the
ethical.
But of course, this project is rooted in our connection to the dead. Arsic describes
Thoreau’s experience: “death does not have the power to interrupt life but instead functions as
the force of its transformation, enabling us to experience finitude while ushering us into what
remains animated.”171 The transformation of the subject in death demands an acknowledgment
that we are not simply our autonomous individuated bodies and that the world and the natural
earth operate in both real and irrational ways. The space for wonder becomes increasingly
necessary upon the death of the other and perhaps acts as the only balm to the pain of this
transubstantiation. The wonder is no less real than the pain, but of course the former is posited in
the realm of the irrational and the latter lives in the realm of the real. These distinctions are
steadfast in our society, but as this thesis has attempted to argue, also arbitrary and fictional. Our
world holds within it the cohabitation of the sacred and the profane for those willing to accept
the possibilities of intersubjectivty and the dead set out in this work.172
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The final portion of this work steps back from traditional philosophical writing and will
look at three different works of art: the first is the cartoon work of Tristan Douglas, which deals
with his link to the other after death; the second is the photography of Jordan Marklund, the best
friend of Tristan, who passed away this past year; and finally, the third is my own painting paired
with one of Jordan’s photographs. These serve a two-fold purpose. First, all three contain a
mixture of the sacred in the profane and ask the viewer to deal with the transcendental from a
seat in the real. Secondly, they create a dialogue with the dead, which offers three concrete
examples of how the in-between continues after death and showcases death as a transformation
of life but not as a total end. When Hamlet promises to remember his father, he sets himself into
a temporality that is always flowing back into the past, acting as a catalyst to his infamous
inability to act:
Yea, from the table of my memory
I'll wipe away all trivial fond records,
All saws of books, all forms, all pressures past,
That youth and observation copied there;
And thy commandment all alone shall live
Within the book and volume of my brain,
Unmix'd with baser matter: yes, by heaven!173
But this need not be the only direction our remembrance moves. Indeed, before we know it, our
remembrance begins to open into our present and chug steadily forward towards the future,
creating and changing, mixing and evolving. The other continues on after death in an irrational
but fully real way when we invite them into the dynamic flowing temporality of our lives.

how we can continue to see the sacred in all its wonder and possibility within the painful reality
of the profane world. In many ways, this project’s foundation is built upon this anatheistic spirit:
how can we experience the wonder and the pain of death. “anatheism- the return of the sacred
after the disappearance of God…” See: Kearney, 102.
173
Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 1, scene 5, lines 840-842.

Lawson 90

Chapter 3: Using art to Explore the Relationship to the other after Death and in Life
“It is required that You do awake your faith.” - Winter’s Tale, William Shakespeare
Did it matter then, she asked herself, walking towards Bond Street, did it matter
that she must inevitably cease completely; all this must go on without her; did she
resent it; or did it not become consoling to believe that death ended absolutely?
but that somehow in the streets of London, on the ebb and flow of things, here,
there, she survived, Peter survived, lived in each other, she being part, she was
positive, of the trees at home; of the house there, ugly, rambling all to bits and
pieces as it was; part of people she had never met; being laid out like a mist
between the people she knew best, who lifted her on their branches as she had
seen the trees lift the mist, but it spread ever so far, her life, herself.
- Mrs. Dalloway, Virginia Woolf

As a conclusion to this work, I will turn to reified artistic examples of how the dead live
on in the modes of subjectivity and intersubjectivity proposed in this thesis. This
transubstantiation of the dead into the living, or rather, this recognition of the vital blending of
body, earth, and memory, asks the viewer to recognize the life that continually gives itself from
that which we have assumed to be dead. Furthermore, this is the portion of the thesis that asks
the viewer for active participation. While the reader had the possibility of being an armchair
philosopher for the first two chapters (though of course, this would not be my recommendation
for reading this or any philosophy), the last chapter only reveals itself to the thinker who is
willing to join in this vitalist endeavour. Let this final portion of the text, then, be a personal
exploration of the notions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity in the face of life and death and
see whether these notions hold true for your own experience of the art works presented, and by
extension, your own experiences of art and humanity. Allow this to be the initial grounds on
which you can judge the intersubjective experience that I have set out in this text. If it does not
work for you, if it falls short of your own experience, I entreat you to ask why and to share with
me how your own experience differs. If you cannot live and breathe the philosophy of this text,
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then by all means, place it aside. But it is my hope that through this art, you will begin to
experience the state of the subject as body, earth and memory, and begin to feel your own links
to the art as links to other human beings in the intersubjectivity set out. Each artwork will be
paired with a commentary to curate the experience of the art, but ultimately, the experience
belongs to the individual viewer.
In the art of Tristan Douglas, we observe his own methods of vitalism in blending the living
with the dead in cartoon form. Tristan entreats the viewer to recognize the blurred lines of life
and death and how we live with the dead. The in-between, the creative impulse between the artist
and the dead is unmistakable. Each piece asks the viewer to acknowledge the flashes of
merriment in the bare skull. In a brief commentary on his work and its relationship to the
deceased, Tristan claims:
The only purpose behind my art is to make me laugh. My best friend’s passing didn’t
change what I drew initially, but as the first anniversary drew closer I found myself
thinking more about death; more specifically, what we look like a year after. All the
negative energy I would feel about what had happened got channeled into these drawings,
but death is never the theme. It’s just kind of in the background, like it is for everyone.

Tristan’s art remains light: he maintains the infinite jest of life alongside the fact of death. Banal
moments of everyday life mingle with skeletal figures in humorous and existential ways. Just as
a good production of Samuel Beckett can get more laughs than Noel Coward, one cannot help
but chuckle at Tristan’s unnerving and humorous juxtapositions. Much has been made of the
power behind laughter and its ability to shatter our logical comprehension of the world174 and
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Tristan’s art uses that power to break down our fears of death and our avoidance of seeing death
in the shadows of our day to day lives.

Photograph by Jordan Marklund of Tristan Douglas and their shadows

My hope is that the viewer will allow the laughter, the chuckle, the cartoon, to assist in shaking
him or her from the serious academic mindset with which we read philosophy and instead open
up to the possibility of a play between life and death and in this way, enter into the
intersubjective experience of the art, rather than simply observing how the artist himself is
affected by an intersubjectivity between living artist and deceased friend.
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The Artwork of Tristan Douglas
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“and dread”

“Only 5 cents”
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“still dead”
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“trade”
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“peas in a pod”
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“I hate you, the moon”
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“buddies”
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“where is the party?’
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Next, the photography of Jordan Marklund is set alongside my own commentary. A dear
friend of mine who died quite unexpectedly, Jordan is the friend who inspired Tristan’s
existential cartoons. Jordan’s photography speaks of reflection, time, possible worlds, shadows,
and memory from a vibrant place. Collaborating with the deceased is a strange proposition and in
many ways a dangerous one. I run the risk of making claims that Jordan himself would find a
stretch, incorrect, or perhaps too nostalgic. Without the living, breathing person, my own
speculation is not forced to stand and be judged by the artist and will not hear the words so
feared by Prufrock: that is not what I meant at all. That is not it at all. Instead, my voice
becomes his voice. Like Thoreau argues in regard to his deceased brother, I live a double life in
this project, following my own dreams and goals while also taking on those of Jordan. My hope
is that my goals do not consume or warp Jordan’s, though I suppose that it is nearly impossible
not to spin his work in a web that makes the most sense of my project. It is also impossible to tell
where my work was influenced by him and where I have made his work blend with my own. Do
his photos really see the world in the way I have described? Or am I merely projecting my own
desires? Or after hours of conversations and bottles of wine, have our two worlds merged in
ways that his photography and my words, his photography and my art, say the same thing? This
latter suggestion is my inclination, but again, I cannot ever know this for certain.
I have tried in this commentary to share Jordan’s world view and not my own. But of
course, the two worlds overlap in a myriad of ways. This is also why I have separated my
painting from his photography collection. His photographs are just his own, while the mixture of
his photograph and my art that makes up the third part of this final chapter, as well as the short
film that opens this thesis, take on that which is more about my loss than his life. In this
collection of photographs, Jordan comes alive. His work reveals who he is and the worlds he
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experienced: the viewer is invited to see the world from Jordan’s point of view. In every book we
read by a deceased author, or every piece of art we stand in front of in vast galleries of
masterpieces by scores of departed artists, we see the worlds of the creators. When we are open
to the work, when we step beyond our intellectual or logical understanding, we also experience
these worlds and commune with the dead. We create with the deceased, we open up worlds
under the tutelage of those who are gone. Harrison asks, “Who are these loquacious masks in the
theatre of literature- Antiklea, Achilles, Odysseus, but also Aeneas, Farinata, Lear, Quixote,
Bovary- and where do they speak from? Where and above all how? They are all untenably dead,
yet they are alive to the degree that, through the poem, they can be seen and heard by us.” 175 As
an academic, I spend my time with the dead: connecting, reading, devouring, creating with those
who are long since gone. Art connoisseurs do the same, as do history buffs, and bookworms. We
create with the dead all of the time.
Hannah Arendt believed that it is our responsibility to tell the stories of exemplary human
beings and she did so time and again in works such as Men in Dark Times or Rahel Varnhagen.
It was Arendt’s belief that only after death could a person’s life be measured and their story be
told. Was Jordan exemplary? Does his life warrant a narrative? Knowing him, I can certainly say
he was not perfect, and loving him, I can certainly say that I may not be the best person to judge
him objectively. With this in mind, I will say that he was one of the few people I have met who
inspired me to see the world differently, to challenge myself and rethink the parameters of the
worlds in which I live. The way he looked at the world was rare and wonderful and shaped the
way I saw my own agency and existence. That is what I have tried to continue in this
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photography collection: the creation of worlds between Jordan and myself. Beyond this, and
most importantly, I hope that it invites the viewer into these worlds, this natality, this creation.176

The following has been independently published as a collection of Jordan’s
photography. If you are interested in seeing this collection in book form please contact Kathryn
Lawson at kathryn.m.lawson@gmail.com
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A Moveable Feast:
Shadows, reflections and possible worlds in the photography of Jordan Marklund
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There is something incredibly intimate about the photography in this
collection. Jordan invites his viewers to see the world through his
eyes: A world that is often dirty and broken, yet infused with
transcendence. His work focuses on everyday objects and imbues them
with magical realism. The photographs in this collection offer a
glimpse at worlds within worlds. One reality is layered upon another
through shadows, reflections, and openings between contrasting spaces.
Jordan’s photographs point to a defiance of traditional understanding
of time and space, asking the viewer to see the possibility of the
sacred, illogical, transcendent beauty housed within the profane,
logical immanence of our everyday lives. On one level, time and space
move according to plan: there is rust, graffiti, garbage, and a linear
flow of time towards the future. On another level, time flows
ceaselessly into the past, offering a nostalgic and surrealist view of
the world. This double temporal flow into future and past, arrests the
viewer in the present moment. We could call his style of work an
optimistic misanthropy or perhaps a pessimistic wonder. In An Ideal
Husband, Oscar Wilde states, “It takes great courage to see the world
in all its tainted glory, and still to love it.” This is the gift of
Jordan’s photography: a recognition of the world’s cruel decadence
with a stubborn insistence to love it anyway.
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Shadows
The three main motifs of this collection linger in a liminal world.
Reified in the fixed photograph, they serve as metonymies for that
which cannot be spoken or reified. Jordan’s work with shadows offers
the presence of a person without that person’s physical body. At times
unnerving, the shadow asks us to imagine that individual in a way that
we cannot when they are fully given. We must meet the photograph half
way, engage, and create the absent presence. We sense the person more
in an atmospheric mood than in a bodily form. Silhouetted against a
brick wall or broken pavement, the shadow allows the person to merge
with the surrounding world. As Edgar Allan Poe’s famous Ushers
literally merge with the house in which they live, the shadow is as
much an individual person, as it is a quality of the environment. The
shadow has been a recurring theme throughout mythology, religion, and
even psychoanalysis. In Jewish lore, Lilith, the first wife of Adam,
is made at the same time as her husband and the two lived in
equality.177 As society became increasingly patriarchal, Lilith fell
into shadow, as the male rose to the pinnacle of subjectivity.178

Lilith was recognized as early as 700CE with the Alphabet of BenSira: “When God created the first man Adam alone, God said, “It is not good
for man to be alone.” [So] God created a woman for him, from the earth like
him, and called her Lilith. They [Adam and Lilith] promptly began to argue
with each other: She said, “I will not lie below,” and he said, “I will not
lie below, but above, since you are fit for being below and I for being
above.” She said to him, “The two of us are equal, since we are both from the
earth.” And they would not listen to each other. Since Lilith saw [how it
was], she uttered God's ineffable name and flew away into the air. Adam stood
in prayer before his Maker and said, “Master of the Universe, the woman you
gave me fled from me!”” See: Jewish Women's Archive, "Alphabet of Ben Sira
78: Lilith," (Viewed on July 15, 2017) <https://jwa.org/media/alphabet-ofben-sira-78-lilith>.
178
In the 13th-century writings of Isaac ben Jacob ha-Cohen, Lilith
left Adam after she refused to become subservient to him. She then partners
with the Archangel Samael and refuses to return to Eden. See: Rabbi Isaac haKohen, “The Treatise on the Left Emanation,” in The Early Kabbalah, ed.
Joseph Dans, trans. Ronald C. Kiener, 244-264 (New York: Paulist Press,
1986).
177
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By creating Eve from his own rib, Adam created an anti-subject that
made his own subjectivity possible. The distinction, later taken up by
Lacan, between light and dark, male and female, good and bad, black
and white was born with Eve. As a woman equal to men, Lilith became an
impossibility, a shadow, representing everything that was woman and
not subservient.179 Defying the logic of the world in which we live,
Lilith suggests the impossible, the unrecognizable, and the
incomprehensible. In many ways Lilith is the shadow of womankind, she
is the possibility of the impossible.
In German folklore, the doppelgänger is the shadow or the dark
mirror of our self. Without their own shadow, the doppelgänger is an
evil shadow of a person who prophesizes doom. Edgar Allan Poe refers
to this phenomenon in his sonnet, “Silence”:
There are some qualities—some incorporate things,
That have a double life, which thus is made
A type of that twin entity which springs
From matter and light, evinced in solid and shade.
There is a two-fold Silence—sea and shore—
Body and soul.180

The term Lilith first occurs in a list of animals in Isaiah 34:14 and
is translated as "night creatures", (The Complete Jewish Bible)"night
monster" (American Standard Version of the Holy Bible), "night hag"(Revised
Standard Version Bible), or "screech owl"(King James Bible, 21st Century
version).
180 Edgar Allan Poe, “Silence,” in The Complete Poetry of Edgar Allan Poe
(New York: Signet Classics, 1996), 87.
179
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In his fable, “The Shadow”, Hans Christian Anderson writes of a shadow
who, freed from the fetters of its master, grows powerful and
substantial as the master becomes an increasingly weak shade.181 The
motif of the shadow is adapted by psychiatrist C.G. Jung, who posits
the “shadow” as our unconscious desires. For Jung, the shadow is the
compilation of all the things we do not allow into our persona. For
the most part, this more primal aspect of our being lies at our feet,
unnoticed, but in cases of extreme fatigue, stress, or intoxication,
the shadow takes over. An archetypal aspect of the human psyche, the
shadow is not simply an evil force, but contains powerful drives of
creation, desire, and a connection to our sense of spirituality.182 To
experience our own shadow, or that of the other, is to experience a
primal creative or perhaps destructive force. In all of these
representations of the shadow, a common theme is its defiance of our
logical awareness. It demands us to see beyond our own boundaries and
experience the world in a different, perhaps more uncomfortable, and
certainly more mysterious way.
181 Hans Christian Andersen, “The Shadow” in Hans Andersen Forty-Two
Stories, trans. M.R. James (London: Faber and Faber, 1953).
182 See Carl G Jung, The Collected Works of C.G. Jung, Volume 9 Part II:
Aion Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self, ed. and trans. Gerhard
Adler and R.F.C Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 423.‘‘If
it has been believed hitherto that the human shadow was the source of all
evil, it can now be ascertained on closer investigation that the unconscious
man, that is, his shadow, does not consist only of morally reprehensible
tendencies, but also displays a number of good qualities, such as normal
instincts, appropriate reactions, realistic insights, creative impulses,
etc.”
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Reflections
The second major theme of this collection is reflection. Many of
Jordan’s photographs use glass, water, mirrors, or buildings to
reflect objects not present in the photo. In these works, Jordan often
contrasts a banal or even stark everyday world with a beautiful,
stunning, almost unworldly reflection. The viewer is asked to look
closely at the everyday and discover an ulterior reality. Reflections
overflow the object with a visual excess rather than the void our
imaginations must fill when we encounter shadows, these reflections
also defy our logical comprehension of the world and as such, ask us
to see the emergence of other possible worlds within our neat and tidy
logical existence. Since as early as 50BC, the tale of Narcissus183 has
told of a beautiful young man who spurns his admirers. Walking through
the forest, young Narcissus catches a glimpse of himself in a pool of
water and becomes captivated by his own reflection. Unable to
recognize the reflection as a mere image without substance, he withers
away before his own likeness, unable to turn away from the beauty. In
psychology, this tale has come to exclusively moralize the danger of
excessive self-love and self-involvement. But it also sets out the
allure of reflections, of images that are not what our logical mind
believes. The beauty of Van Gogh184 and Monet185 revolves around an
ability to create a world of reflections. In their art, we see the
world reflected back as if through swirling water.

The earliest version of the story is ascribed to the poet Parthenius
of Nicaea in 50 BC: David Keys, "Ancient manuscript sheds new light on an
enduring myth," BBC History Magazine 5, no. 5 (2004), 9. Several versions of
the myth have survived from ancient sources. The classic version is: Ovid,
“Echo and Narcissus” in Metamorphoses, trans. A.D. Melville, 51-73 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1986).
184 For example, Vincent Van Gogh, Starry Night Over the Rhône, oil on
canvas (Paris: Musee D’Orsay, 1888). Beyond his work that deals directly with
reflections, Van Gogh also paints the logical everyday world as if it were a
reflection.
185 For example, his series of the Houses of Parliament in London or his
water lilies. See: Claude Monet, Le Parlement de Londres, soleil couchant,
oil on canvas (Washington: National Gallery of Art, 1903).
183
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Indeed, when Alice enters the land of Jabberwockys, walruses, and
carpenters, it is by stepping through a mirror into another reality.
It is not a difficult leap to believe that a mirror may contain an
alternate world, or that crystal balls and magic mirrors can see into
the future. In Kabbalistic Judaism, it is traditional to cover the
mirrors in a house of mourning because the deceased leave behind a
void that attracts evil demons, who can only be seen in the mirrors.186
But of course, there is also the vanity that mirrors imply, which is
considered uncouth in a time of mourning. The Romans believed that a
broken mirror meant bad luck, as the mirror contained the soul of the
person who looked in it and to break this meant to shatter one’s soul
and remain soulless for the seven years it took for the body to
rejuvenate itself.187 The idea that reflections hold our soul suggests
that the reflection is not the objective, physical thing-in-itself,
but rather the essence of the thing. It is as close as we can get to
experiencing the interior nature of a thing. Dangerous aesthetic
objects that one could almost hold in the palm of the hand, the
reflection is an embodiment of wonder. These photographs ask the
viewer to look deeper and experience the wonder glimmering from within
our daily existence.

186 See: Hillel Hankin, After One-hundred-and-Twenty: Reflecting on
Death, Mourning, and the Afterlife in the Jewish Tradition (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2016).
187 Edwin Radford and Mona Augusta Radford, The Encyclopedia of
Superstitions, ed. Christina Hole (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1961),
232.
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Possible Worlds
The final motif that this collection highlights is that of other
possible worlds, the likes of which are contained in shadows and
reflections, as well as Jordan’s shots of contrasting mediums and
horizons. A blue sky opening over a grey cityscape, or bright light
bursting down in patches across a steely lake, offer an interplay of
light and dark, of two or more possible worlds in one photograph.
Austrian physicist Erwin Schrödinger has the famous thought experiment
known as Schrödinger’s cat, in which a cat in a box is simultaneously
considered both alive and dead.188 When the box is opened, the cat is
observed as either one or the other but not both. Jordan’s possible
worlds account for the moment when the cat is simultaneously both.
These worlds are not simply the physical earth, but rather human
interpretations and projections onto the world. Each of these photos
allows us to entertain the possibilities of the world as reality and
the world as magical. For example, consider the “world of the shaman”
as opposed to the “world of the lumberjack”: In one world a tree is a
living, breathing entity that bestows wisdom upon those who can speak
its language and in the other world the tree is an object to be cut
and chopped in exchange for monetary compensation. What makes Jordan’s
possible worlds so fascinating is that he gives us both the world of
the shaman and the world of the lumberjack, as it were: the sacred is
nestled within the profane, wonder glimmers within the banality of our
everyday existence.

Erwin Schrödinger, “The Present situation in Quantum Mechanics”
trans. John D Trimmer, in Proceedings of the American Philosophical society
124, (1980): 323-338.
188
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The main motifs of this collection point to beauty and wonder as a
moveable feast. In his reflections on his life as a young ex-pat in
Paris, Ernest Hemingway contends: “If you are lucky enough to have
lived in Paris as a young man, then wherever you go for the rest of
your life, it stays with you, for Paris is a moveable feast.” In the
midst of a lost generation, a post-war age that had lost all sense of
meaning, Hemingway takes the notion of Easter as a moveable feast and
places his new foundation, meaning, and raison d'être, as an urban
center bustling with art, food, and creative comradery. In particular,
the love he shares with his first wife, Hadley during his Parisian
years becomes something he carries with him, a possibility. Just as
Easter carries the promise of resurrection, of spring, and of new
beginnings, Paris becomes a source of possibility and hope in
Hemingway’s book. Similarly, Jordan’s photography carries wonder into
places of pain and beauty into moments of sorrow. Wonder becomes a
moveable feast inserted into the realism that his camera uncovers.
While time marches on ceaselessly, Jordan’s works open a gateway to
time’s continual backward glance and remind us that time moves not
just in one direction, but is continually drawn into past, present,
and future. As we pause before his work, we begin by being drawn into
the future, the landscape of our world and our possible place in it,
we are arrested by the mirrors, the reflection, the shadows, and find
ourselves in the present moment, acknowledging the link between these
possible worlds, and finally, these motifs capture us and “we beat on,
boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.”189
It is my hope that the viewer allows these works to open organically,
to linger in each temporal direction and to exist as both raw profane
life and transcendent beauty.

F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby (Planet-ebook, 2012).
http://www.planetebook.com/ebooks/The-Great-Gatsby.pdf
189
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Brave New Worlds and the life of the Dead

“Brave New World: Views of Toronto”

Finally, I will end with a piece of art that is a mixture of Jordan’s photography and my
own painting/ multi medium work. In many ways, this moves beyond the natality between
Jordan and myself because in adding to a piece that he meant to be a standalone, I am moving
into uncertain territory and at the very least creating with but beyond Jordan. This piece is meant
to reflect the impression of Jordan that remains with me after his death. On the canvas is printed
one of his photographs of the city that he made his home. His love of Toronto and its
neighborhoods, restaurants, sports teams, angry pedestrians, architecture, street food, terrible
transit, and art, are all a major part of who he was and thus, for those who knew him, he remains
very much alive in the city. This photograph sees Toronto through Jordan’s eyes and that is
precisely how I see Toronto as well: a world that he has had an indispensable role in creating. In
the foreground, I have painted in Jordan in his signature button up shirt and tie combination.
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Detail from “Brave New World: Views of Toronto”

Rather than painting in his face, I have used a blur reminiscent of Francis Bacon’s faces. I
have always loved the grotesque movement and liminality of Bacon’s works and spent hours
examining them with Jordan at a recent exhibit in Toronto. In 2015, I saw the ballet
“L’Anatomie de la sensation,” based on the artwork of Bacon. This ballet brought out the beauty
of this grotesque world in a way that I had not previously conceived. This liminal grotesque
beauty seems to me to be the experience of the I in relation to the deceased other. The inability to
be fully reified speaks to the condition of death: still present in the world but without clear lines
and structure. We are beckoned toward the shadows and glimpses, but the person who we seek is
not there in the same way.
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Detail from “Brave New World: Views of Toronto”

So what is there? What remains? There are many ways to describe how Jordan carries on
beyond his physical body: in the earth, his favourite city, his clothing, and the worlds that he has
created with others, in the memories of those who knew him and the language that speaks these
memories, sharpens, deepens, and expands his presence in the precision of each word. In
Buddhist philosophy, everything is Buddha-nature and it is the work of the practitioner to see the
whole as a play of consciousness. In Buddhist prayers190, the practitioner envisions the Buddha
in incredible detail and envisions her or himself becoming the Buddha. In the prayer’s
conclusion, the Buddha dissolves into pure energy, or the sound of the “om”. The Buddha and
the practitioner alike are everywhere and nowhere. Here, one can also consider Nicholas of
Cusa’s assertion that God is an infinite circle whose center is everywhere and whose

190

For example, Ngawang Losang Tenpa Gyaltsan, Medicine Buddha Sadhana, ed. Ven.
Thubten Gyatso, trans. Lama Thubten Zopa Rinpoche, (Oregon: FPMT Inc., 2013).
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circumference is nowhere.191 The Buddha here is meant to show a presence and an all
pervasiveness in absence. No longer in his physical body, Jordan remains pervasive and alive in
the city he loves.
These three works of art are incredibly different and as you look through them, I
encourage you to continually turn back to notions of the subject and intersubjectivity set out in
this text.192 Perhaps this can be the beginning of a conscious communion with the dead …

Photograph by Jordan Marklund

See Nicholas of Cusa, “On Learned Ignorance”, in Nicholas of Cusa: Selected
Spiritual Writings, trans. H. Lawrence Bond (New York: Paulist Press, 1997), esp. 102, 116- 124
192
Furthermore, this text culminates in the movement from intersubjectvity to
intrasubjectivity, which inevitably takes place after the other’s death, and which can be observed
in this final example of art that is a being-with, but also a being-beyond the other after his death.
191
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